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STATEMENT OF THE QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Did the Court of Appeals err in, sua sponte, awarding perma-
nent alimony instead of transitional alimony to an able-bodied, young, 
professionally-trained spouse who can earn a substantial professional 
income and who consistently worked in her profession during a rela-
tively short marriage, where the District Court found an award of per-
manent alimony unnecessary and unjustified, and neither party 
requested permanent alimony either in the appeal briefs or in oral 
argument on appeal? 
REPORT OF OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The opinion of the Court of Appeals is reported at Thronson 
v. Thronson, 157 Utah Adv. Rep. 51 (1991) [hereinafter Thronson]. and 
is appended hereto as Exhibit 1. 
STATEMENT OF THE GROUNDS ON WHICH THE JURISDICTION 
OF THE SUPREME COURT IS INVOKED 
The date of entry of the Decision of the Court of Appeals is 
March 25, 1991. The date of the Order Denying Appellee's Petition for 
Rehearing is May 21, 1991. The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction to 
review the decision of the Court of Appeals herein pursuant to the 
provisions of Utah Code Ann. S 78-2-2 (1953 as amended), and Rule 45 
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
Utah Code Ann. S 30-3-5 provides, in pertinent part: 
. . . when a decree of divorce is rendered, the 
court may include in it equitable orders relating 
to the children, property and parties. 
Id. In addition, determinative authority is contained within the 
cases cited herein. 
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(b) That the amount of child support awarded by the 
District Court was improper. 
(c) That the District Court's award of certain finan-
cial assets and support to Ms. Thronson, including but not limited to 
the amount of alimony, was too low. 
On March 25, 1991, the Court of Appeals affirmed the deci-
sion of the District Court on most of the financial issues, and 
remanded the custody and child support issues to the District Court 
for review based upon, inter alia, certain recent statutory amendments 
to the Utah Code regarding joint custody. 
With respect to alimony, the Court of Appeals affirmed the 
District Court's award of $800 per month, but sua sponte increased the 
term of that award from a transitional period of one year, as set by 
the District Court, to a permanent award. It is with respect to this 
specific portion of the Opinion of the Court of Appeals that this 
Petition is filed. 
2. Statement of the Facts Relevant to the Issues Presented 
for Review — It was undisputed at trial that Ms. Thronson had an 
undergraduate degree and a professional degree in Pharmacy. She had 
been continuously licensed to practice Pharmacy in the State of Utah 
since 1978, and has in fact practiced Pharmacy in Utah since that 
time. (Tr. 271-72). In addition, throughout the course of the mar-
riage of the parties (as well as prior to the marriage) Ms. Thronson 
consistently worked either full-time or part-time in the profession of 
Pharmacy. Moreover, she has taken advanced courses toward a doctorate 
degree in Pharmacy, and has been an adjunct professor of Pharmacy at 
the University of Utah School of Pharmacy. (R. 388). Ms. Thronson 
conceded she is young, able-bodied and fully capable of working in her 
profession full-time. (Tr. 275). 
Neither party contributed to the financial or other aspects 
of the education, training or award of the other's professional 
degrees or licensures. Each party sought and obtained his or her own 
education and employment, all of which occurred prior to the marriage 
of the parties. Ms. Thronson made her own voluntary career decision 
to go into Pharmacy, as did Mr. Thronson with respect to Law. (R. 
389). 
The District Court, in carefully reviewing all of the facts, 
found that Ms. Thronson was fully capable of supporting herself in her 
chosen profession, and, in light of that fact, as well as in view of 
the substantial additional assets which Ms. Thronson had received and 
would receive from this relatively short marriage of nine years prior 
to separation, the District Court awarded her transitional alimony of 
$800 per month for one year. (R. 385). 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the award of $800 per month. 
However, the Court of Appeals decided that the alimony award should be 
permanent rather than transitional, and so ordered. 
ARGUMENTS 
The decision of the Court of Appeals in this case, to sua 
sponte abrogate the District Court's award of transitional alimony and 
make it permanent, is in direct conflict with all of the applicable 
prior decisions of panels of the Court of Appeals and with the great 
majority of relevant decisions of this Court. The decision of the 
Court of Appeals to award permanent alimony, rather than transitional 
alimony, is in addition a substantial departure from the accepted and 
usual course of judicial determinations and proceedings in cases of 
this type. 
A. A Sua Sponte Award of Permanent Alimony by the 
Court of Appeals Under the Facts and Circumstances 
of this Case is not in Accord with Any Prior Utah 
Case Law 
Over the years, a substantial body of case law has developed 
in Utah and elsewhere with respect to awards of alimony generally, and 
the appropriateness of an award of permanent alimony specifically. 
There is not any researched decision in Utah where an appellate court 
has unilaterally awarded permanent alimony in a fact situation even 
remotely comparable to this, viz: An able-bodied, young, 
professionally-trained spouse, capable of earning a substantial pro-
fessional income, who has worked consistently full-time or part-time 
in her profession during a relatively short marriage. 
Specifically, there has uniformly been a major distinction, 
both in Utah courts and in courts in other jurisdictions, as to the 
way alimony awards are considered, between older, minimally-trained 
spouses who have been married for a lengthy period of time (typically 
20 years or more) and who have been out of the work force for many 
years, on the one hand, and young, professionally-trained spouses who 
have been in relatively short marriages, who have worked during all or 
a substantial portion of those marriages and who are capable of earn-
ing a substantial income on their own, on the other hand. 
A summary recitation of the key Utah cases reflecting this 
uniform distinction should be helpful: See, e.g., Jones v. Jones, 700 
P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985) [permanent alimony awarded to unskilled house-
wife in her mid-50's who possesses few marketable job skills and who 
has little hope of retraining after 29 years of marriage]; Anderson v. 
Anderson, 757 P.2d 476 (Utah App. 1988) [34-year marriage involving 
housewife spouse who has no outside work skills]; and Asper v. Asper, 
753 P.2d 978 (Utah App. 1988) [27-year marriage with spouse who now is 
working only part-time and who had a disabled minor child]. 
Most recently, in Howell v. Howell, 155 Utah Adv. Rep. 18 
(1991), the Court of Appeals reaffirmed the criteria utilized in 
determining the standards in which permanent alimony in such cases is 
awarded: 
Utah's appellate courts have considered the 
appropriateness of alimony after a long-term mar-
riage, where the wife (usually) has worked prima-
rily in the home, has limited job skills and is in 
her late 40's or 50fs. [citations omitted]. 
Id. at 20. The court continued: 
Defendant [Ms. Howell] fits the profile described 
in . . . [Jones v. Jones] and other cases: she is 
approximately 50 years old, has a minimal market-
able job skills, and has spent most of the 30 plus 
years of the parties' marriage raising and caring 
for their five children in their home, presumably 
with the concurrence of . . . [Mr. Howell]. Her 
likelihood of achieving significant salary levels 
in the future is slim. 
Id. at 21. It cannot reasonably be disputed that Ms. Thronson does 
not fit this well-settled permanent alimony profile. Ms. Thronson is 
young, well-educated, highly-skilled and a highly-paid professional 
with a history of working throughout a relatively short marriage and 
who is jointly raising (along with Mr. Thronson) one normal child who 
is in a private school. 
In support of its modification of the alimony award to make 
it permanent, the Court of Appeals cited Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 
1331 (Utah App. 1988). The Rasband decision is a classic example of 
the type of case in which permanent alimony has typically been 
awarded, and it, like Howell, involves a factual situation and profile 
that is at polar extremes to the undisputed facts in the instant case. 
Ms. Rasband had no education beyond high school and had been married 
for 30 years. Her income was zero and she was caring for an adult 
disabled daughter. The Court of Appeals stated in Rasband:: 
. . .[T]he record evidence indicates that appel-
lant's [Ms. Rasband1s] present and future earning 
capacity is minimal. She had no earnings in the 
year before trial; she has only a high school edu-
cation and average job skills to market. Her 
ability to work is impaired by the disability of 
their adult daughter. She will have difficulty 
finding and retaining a full-time job. If 
employed, her earnings would undoubtedly be meager 
for a long period, given her lack of education, 
training or work experience. [Footnote omitted]. 
Id. at 1334. 
In counter-distinction to the foregoing cases are the cases 
far more closely aligned with the instant factual situation: See, 
e.g., Boyle v. Boyle, 735 P.2d 669 (Utah 1987) [short marriage, prior 
work history and several months of temporary maintenance support 
denial of alimony]; Graff v. Graff, 699 P.2d 765 (Utah 1985) [no ali-
mony awarded to wife with professional degree where parties separated 
after only nine years of marriage]; c.f., Peterson v. Peterson, 642 
P.2d 740 (Utah 1982) [Utah Supreme Court refused to award compensation 
for lost wages to a wife who had voluntarily chosen to terminate her 
employment]. See also Bell v. Bell, 159 Utah Adv. Rep. 33, n.3 (1991) 
[non-permanent alimony appropriate where wife college education, in 
good health, and who worked throughout the marriage]. 
It is important to note that Boyle, Graff, and Peterson are 
decisions in which the Utah Supreme Court upheld the District Court's 
decisions to not award alimony at all, even on a transitional basis. 
In the instant case, after making thorough findings of fact, the Dis-
trict Court awarded alimony but made it transitional, in light of Ms. 
Thronson's earning capability and the large number of other assets 
which she was awarded. All of this makes the Court of Appeals' uni-
lateral determination to make the transitional alimony award a perma-
nent award all the more perplexing and unsupportable. In summary, Ms. 
Thronson in no way fits the Jones/Rasband/Howell profile and none of 
the historical criteria developed in Utah for the award of permanent 
alimony are present in this case, facts doubtless reflected in the 
decision by Ms. Thronson not to even seek such an award. 
Apparently, the sole case in Utah which awarded permanent 
alimony to a spouse that did not fully fit the Jones/Rasband/Howe11 
profile was Davis v. Davis, 749 P.2d 647 (Utah 1988). That case is 
easily distinguishable from the instant case on a number of grounds: 
First, in Davis, this Court merely affirmed the decision of the Dis-
trict Court, finding that it was not "an excessive award." I_d. at 
649. In so doing, this Court acknowledged the broad discretion that 
trial courts have in divorce proceedings, stating 
. . . 
So long as that discretion is exercised within the 
confines of the legal standards we have set . . . 
[citations omitted] and the facts and reasons for 
the decision are set forth fully in appropriate 
findings and conclusions . . . [citation omitted] 
we will not disturb the resulting award. We 
review the findings made by a judge sitting with-
out a jury under the 'clearly erroneous' standard 
of Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a). 
Id. at 648 (citations omitted). The affirmation of the decision of 
the trier of fact in Davis is a far cry from the sua sponte imposition 
of a permanent alimony award by an appellate court that was directly 
contrary to the District Court's decision, to the evidence adduced at 
trial, to the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and to the 
expressed desires of the parties themselves. 
Second, there is some indication in Davis that, at the time 
of the decree of divorce, Ms. Davis was in f,a period of reconstruc-
tion" from certain emotional difficulties and instability. While it 
is unclear to what extent this disability may have influenced the Dis-
trict Court in awarding permanent alimony, it is clear that Ms. 
Thronson was laboring under no such disability at the time of the Dis-
trict Court's award of alimony in the instant case. 
Finally, to the extent, if any, that the Davis decision is 
of any import here, it is overwhelmingly clear that the case is iso-
lated and stands alone against the great weight of authority, in this 
jurisdiction and in virtually every other jurisdiction in this coun-
try, disallowing an award of permanent alimony in situations such as 
the instant case. As there is no relevant case support in Utah justi-
fying an award by the Court of Appeals of permanent alimony under the 
facts in this case, the Court of Appeals1 Opinion awarding permanent 
alimony, as opposed to transitional alimony, should be modified 
accordingly. 
B. An Award of Permanent Alimony Under the Facts and 
Circumstances of this Case is not in Accord with 
the Great Weight of Applicable Researched Deci-
sions in the United States 
Counsel for Mr. Thronson has researched hundreds of deci-
sions in virtually every jurisdiction in the United States to deter-
mine if there are cases which support an award of permanent alimony 
under a fact situation similar to the facts in this case. None have 
been found. Virtually all of the researched decisions from other 
1
 Louisiana, which uses a version of French Civil Law, utilizes a 
fault-based determination of whether or not to award permanent 
Footnote continued on next page. 
jurisdictions follow the same line of demarcation with respect to an 
award of permanent versus transitional alimony (or no alimony) as the 
Utah courts. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Hall, 740 P.2d 684 (Mont. 
1987) [wife trained as a nurse not entitled to alimony since she was 
not able to prove inability to support herself]; Briggs v. Briggs, 49 
Or. App. 569, 619 P.2d 1353 (1980) [young age (38) and employment 
potential after earning nursing degree precluded award of alimony]; 
Warren v. Warren, 31 Or. App. 213, 570 P.2d 104 (1977) [no alimony 
provided to wife where 9-year marriage had little or no effect on 
wife's employment skills]. 
There is no support in the case law of other jurisdictions 
for an award of permanent alimony under the facts presented here, and 
the Court of Appeals' Opinion should be modified accordingly. 
C. Ms. Thronson Did Not Seek Permanent Alimony Either 
at Trial or on Appeal 
A critically important element of the case is the fact that 
at no time has Ms. Thronson asked the trial court, either during trial 
2 
or thereafter, to award her meaningful permanent alimony, nor did Ms. 
Thronson ever ask the Court of Appeals, either in the briefs or in 
oral argument, to award her any permanent alimony at all. 
Footnote continued from previous page. 
alimony. Utah, on the other hand, many years ago concluded that fault 
has no place in the setting of alimony, and that alimony is not meant 
to inflict punitive damages on a husband. English v. English, 565 
P.2d 409 at 411, quoting 2 Nelson, Divorce and Annulment at 11-12 
(1961). 
2 Ms. Thronson did ask the trial court to award nominal alimony, 
after 5 years, of $1.00 per year. See infra. 
There are only three possible explanations for this fact, 
all of which may well be operative in this case. The first is that 
both parties and their counsel are cognizant that there are a dearth 
of decisions in Utah and elsewhere which permit an award of permanent 
alimony under facts and circumstances of a case such as this. Second, 
because of Ms. Thronson's education, training and professional work 
history, rendering her capable of earning a substantial income on her 
own, it is clear that an award of permanent alimony was unnecessary. 
Third, because of the substantial assets which Ms. Thronson had 
received and was receiving in the divorce decree, as set forth herein 
and in Exhibit 4, Appendix A and B, an award of permanent alimony 
would make the ultimate financial determinations of the District Court 
inequitable. 
During her direct examination in the trial of this case, Ms. 
Thronson's counsel offered into evidence plaintiff's Exhibit 5. This 
exhibit, which sets forth plaintiff's proposal as to, inter alia, ali-
mony, was admitted into evidence as illustrative of her testimony, and 
she agreed that, if she was asked, her testimony would be the same as 
that contained in Exhibit 5. (Tr. 190-91). Plaintiff's proposal was 
that the trial court award alimony in the amount of $2500 per month 
for 5 years and $1.00 per year thereafter. The relevant page from 
trial Exhibit 5 is attached hereto as Exhibit 6. 
In addition, in the briefs which Ms. Thronson filed with the 
Court of Appeals, nowhere did she ask for, or attempt to support, an 
award of permanent alimony. Instead, Ms. Thronson specifically 
requested the Court of Appeals (as she requested the trial court) to 
award alimony of $1,800 per month for a period of five years. (Appeal 
Brief of Appellant at 46, 50). 
Simply put, Ms. Thronson neither requested nor sought at any 
time an award of permanent alimony, instead reiterating the transi-
tional alimony request which she had raised with the District Court 
and, in her briefs, with the Court of Appeals. 
It may be argued that the Court of Appeals has the inherent 
authority to modify an alimony award to any extent that it desires. 
Whether or not that is correct, the actual effects of that portion of 
the Opinion from the Court of Appeals in this case are truly stagger-
ing. The maximum total value of the alimony award which Ms. Thronson 
sought from the Court of Appeals is $108,000.00. The effect of the 
unrequested and unilateral modification (assuming Ms. Thronson lives 
her statistical life expectancy of 47.2 years (Appendix 7 attached 
hereto)) is a permanent alimony award of $453,120.00. This amount 
exceeds by over 4 times the maximum value of the most that Ms. 
Thronson was asking for. 
Since Ms. Thronson had voluntarily chosen, for whatever rea-
son, not to earn meaningful income in her profession during most of 
the pendency of the divorce, the District Court was required to impute 
income to Ms. Thronson of $35,000.00. This figure represented the 
mid-point between $31,000.00 and $39,000.00, which figures the Court 
of Appeals found were based upon competent evidence. Thronson at 55. 
Based solely upon this mid-point "attribution of earnings," the Court 
3 
of Appeals found an income "shortfall" of $800 per month. However, 
the Court of Appeals did not acknowledge that Ms. Thronson was also 
3
 The Court of Appeals ignored the finding of the District Court 
that Ms. Thronson's salary range at the time of the divorce could be 
as high as $39,000.00, when employed full-time as a retail pharmacist, 
which figure would result in an income "shortfall" of only $450 per 
month. 
receiving an additional $989.41 of income from Mr. Thronson, in the 
form of annuity payments from Western National Insurance Company, rep-
resenting deferred income which was being paid as a result of a per-
sonal injury case settled by Mr. Thronson's law firm. (Tr. 295) (R. 
4 392). This is all in addition to the substantial financial support 
which Ms. Thronson received from Mr. Thronson, during the pendency of 
this divorce, for the one-and-one-half year period when Ms. Thronson 
decided not to seek meaningful employment. (Tr. 295). 
In the divorce decree, Ms. Thronson also received a substan-
tial cash payment, ownership in a limited partnership (which has paid 
substantial income to her), the annuity mentioned above, the portion 
of Mr. Thronson's pension and profit sharing plan valued to her at 
over $120,000.00, whatever funds she had retained (after receiving a 
substantial inheritance) that she did not spend to support herself 
when she chose not to be employed in her profession, an IRA account, a 
fully-paid for Mercedes Benz automobile, the residence of the parties, 
among many other things. In addition, Ms. Thronson receives child 
5 
support payments from Mr. Thronson, and Mr. Thronson pays for the 
entirety of Patrick's private school education. All of these sources 
of income, property and payments, taken together, provide Ms. Thronson 
with a standard of living which is in excess of the standard of living 
4
 This annuity expires in January, 1992. However, Ms. Thronson has 
been receiving annuity income of this type since the parties separated 
in early 1988, through the present time, for a period of three-and-
one-half years. 
5
 The District Court ordered child support in the amount of $900 
per month. Ms. Thronson receives less than that, reflective of her 
own substantial income-earning capabilities and the fact that Patrick 
Thronson currently spends over 40% of his time with Mr. Thronson. 
the parties enjoyed during the course of this relatively short mar-
riage. This income, along with the transitional alimony payments 
which Mr. Thronson paid, results in a total attributable income figure 
to her which is far in excess of her actual and necessary monthly liv-
ing expenses. 
Again, there is no factual or legal support for such a pro-
found departure from what the parties advocated or requested in this 
case, and the Court of Appeals' Opinion should be modified 
accordingly. 
D. An Award of Permanent Alimony Under the Facts and 
Circumstances of this Case is Inequitable, Unfair 
and Violative of Public Policy 
This Court is aware that, in years past, alimony was widely 
awarded in many if not most divorce decrees to provide for permanent or 
nearly permanent support to spouses, who typically had no real 
income-earning capabilities and few, if any, meaningful job prospects. 
However, over the years, women have entered both the work force gener-
ally and the professions specifically in large numbers, allowing them 
in many cases to become financially self-sufficient. During this evo-
lutionary phase, the concern of the courts has shifted to one of fos-
tering this self-sufficiency. Alimony is now designed primarily to 
assist the formerly dependent or semi-dependent spouse to achieve or 
re-achieve financial self-sufficiency, so as to vitiate further need 
for alimony. In other words, the purpose of alimony has shifted from 
that of the provision of a "lifetime pension" to that of an interim 
award to promote the transition of the parties from a joint married 
state to a separate single state. See, e.g., Hull v. Hull, 83 Md. App. 
218, 574 A.2d 20 (1990). 
The decision of the Court of Appeals, with respect to the 
issue of permanent alimony, undercuts the specific societal interests 
of rehabilitation and self-sufficiency. Rather than encourage a 
spouse, who is otherwise educationally and professionally fully capable 
of earning a substantial income, to earn that income, the Court of 
Appeals' award of permanent alimony encourages exactly the sort of fis-
cal gerrymandering which occurred in the trial phase of the instant 
case: Substantial underemployment during the pendency of the divorce, 
coupled with an effort to inflate living expenses, in an attempt to 
obtain a court order compelling the working spouse to make up the 
income/expense "shortfall'' for the rest of his or her life. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court of Appeals' award of permanent alimony is inconsis-
tent with all previous decisions of other panels of that Court and the 
great weight of the decisions of this Court. Moreover, the Court of 
Appeals' sua sponte modification, of the award of transitional alimony 
to permanent alimony, is inconsistent with virtually all comparable 
decisions in every other jurisdiction in the United States. 
Further, the modification of the District Court's decision by 
the Court of Appeals creates an award of alimony far in excess of what 
was ever requested or urged by Ms. Thronson. 
Finally, the magnitude of the permanent alimony modification, 
in light of the facts and circumstances of this case, makes such a mod-
ification manifestly inequitable and unfair. 
For the foregoing reasons, petitioner requests this Court to 
grant this Petition for Writ of Certiorari. 
DATED t h i s etoA*s of JU4i£-
CAMPBELL, MAACK & SESSIONS 
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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JACKSON, Judge: 
Mary Thronson appeals provisions of a divorce decree and 
separate order awarding joint legal custody of a child, child 
support, alimony, and property. We remand for further 
proceedings regarding child custody and support. We modify the 
alimony award and affirm the remainder of the decree. 
FACTS 
The parties were married on September 30, 1978. Their 
marriage was the first for both. She was a full-time 
pharmacist and he a full-time attorney. A son was born to them 
on September 11, 1981. She became the child's primary 
caretaker and a part-time pharmacist. He became a shareholder 
in his law firm. She filed a complaint for divorce. He filed 
a counterclaim for divorce. They were divorced by a decree 
entered June 23, 1989. A separate order of joint legal custody 
was also entered. Further relevant facts will be set forth 
below in our treatment of the respective issues. 
CHILD CUSTODY AWARD 
Ms, Thronson challenges the joint legal custody decree and 
order on two grounds: (1) She did not agree to the order of 
joint legal custody and Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.2 (1989) 
required the agreement of both parents at the time of this 
decree and order. (2) The provision for an automatic award of 
sole custody to one parent when the other moves from the state 
was error. 
CHILD CUSTODY IN UTAH 
Prior to 1988, Utah did not have a statute expressly 
authorizing an award of "joint legal custody"1 of a child. Our 
1. Custody terminology: Many legislators, judges and writers 
have been loose with their "joint" custody language. Early 
articles identified this vexing problem as follows: 
Both the forms of custody [sole, divided, 
split, joint] following divorce and the terms 
which describe them are vague and 
overlapping. The lack of standard 
definitions and the courts' tendency to use 
certain terms interchangeably have created 
confusion. 
Folberg & Graham, Joint Custody of Children Following pjvorce, 
12 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 523, 525 (1979). 
Often, when referring to one of these custody 
arrangements, courts use vague language or 
inadequately defined terms. 
Bratt, Joint Custody. 67 Ky. L.J. 271, 283 (1978-79). 
One author points out that considerable semantic confusion 
has resulted possibly because the "term" joint custody predates 
the "concept" of joint custody as it is known today. He 
states: "I have encountered at least fifteen terms used to 
refer to various alternatives to sole custody: joint legal 
custody, joint physical custody, divided custody, separate 
custody, alternating custody, split custody, managing 
conservatorship, possessory conservatorship, equal custody, 
shared custody, partial custody, custody 'given to neither 
party to the exclusion of the other,1 temporary custody, 
shifting custody, and concurrent custody." Miller, Joint 
Custody, 13(3) Fam. L.Q. 345, 360 n. 79 (1979). 
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divorce statutes have contained various child custody-
provisions since 1903. For many years Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 
(1989) has authorized district courts to include in divorce 
decrees "equitable orders relating to the children, property 
and parties." Further, Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10 has contained 
various specific provisions regarding factors to be considered 
in awarding sole custody of a child. See Lembach v. Cox, 639 
P.2d 197 (Utah 1981); 1 Utah L.Rev. 363 (1989) (historical 
development of child custody factors and preferences in Utah). 
"Joint Legal Custody" was specifically added to the sole 
custody statute in 1988, and designated as § 30-3-10.1 to 
-10.4. We emphasize that this is a joint "legal" custody 
statute and not a joint "physical" custody statute. In the 
1988 Utah legislative session, Senator Hillyard stated: "This 
is not joint physical custody. The child obviously can't live 
in two homes. But it's joint legal custody which would give 
the non-custodial parent more involvement in the decisions of 
child raising." Floor Debate, (Feb. 3, 1988) Sen. Recording 
No. 42, side 2. In section 10.1 the legislature provided its 
definition of joint legal custody: 
In this chapter, "joint legal custody" 
(1) means the sharing of the rights, 
privileges, duties, and powers of a parent by 
both parents, where specified; 
(2) may include an award of exclusive 
authority by the court to one parent to make 
specific decisions; 
(3) does not affect the physical custody 
of the child except as specified in the order 
of joint legal custody; 
(4) is not based on awarding equal or 
nearly equal periods of physical custody of 
and access to the child to each of the 
parents, as the best interest of the child 
often requires that a primary physical 
residence for the child be designated; and 
(5) does not prohibit the court from 
specifying one parent as the primary 
caretaker and one home as the primary 
residence of the child. 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.1 (1989). Subsections (1) and (2) 
define joint legal custody: both parents share the authority 
and responsibility to make basic decisions regarding their 
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child's welfare. Subsections (3), (4) and (5) tell us what 
joint legal custody is not — it is not joint physical 
custody. We note that this statute does not contain a 
definition of nor a provision for "joint physical custody." 
Subsection 10.2(1) created a "rebuttable presumption" that 
joint legal custody is in the best interest of a child. But, 
that presumption was made subject to subsection (2) which 
provided: 
The court may order joint legal custody if it 
determines that: 
(a) both parents agree to an order of joint 
legal custody; 
(b) joint legal custody is in the best 
interest of the child; and 
(c) both parents appear capable of 
implementing joint legal custody. 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.2 (1989). 
The order remains discretionary with the court, not 
mandatory, even when all three conditions are satisfied, i.e., 
(1) parental agreement, (2) best interests, and (3) parents 
capable of implementation. Further sections of the statute 
emphasize its "parental agreement" posture. We note that 
section 10.3 — terms of joint legal custody order — contains 
two further subsections dealing with parental agreement: 
(2) The court shall, where possible, include 
in the order the terms agreed to between the 
parties; . . . 
(5) The agreement may contain a dispute 
resolution procedure the parties agree to use 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.3 (1989). Moreover, the termination 
provisions, section 10.4, confer upon one parent the right to 
unilaterally terminate the order of joint legal custody. The 
order can be terminated simply by filing and serving a motion. 
Once the motion is filed, the court is required to replace the 
order '•with an order of sole legal custody under Section 
30-3-10.- Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.4 (1989). This provision 
emphasizes the parental agreement stance of the statute as 
initially adopted and in force at the time of this divorce. 
We return to section 10.2(3) to point out that the 
legislature created a list of factors the court sliaJLl consider 
in determining the best interest of a child in the context of 
joint legal custody (not joint physical custody). Those 
factors are: 
890547-CA 4 
(a) whether the physical, psychological, and 
emotional needs and development of the child 
will benefit from joint legal custody; 
(b) the ability of the parents to give first 
priority to the welfare of the child and 
reach shared decisions in the child's best 
interest; 
(c) whether each parent is capable of 
encouraging and accepting a positive 
relationship between the child and the other 
parent; 
(d) whether both parents participated in 
raising the child before the filing of the 
suit; 
(e) the geographical proximity of the homes 
of the parents; 
(f) if the child is 12 years of age or older, 
any preference of the child for or against 
joint legal custody; and 
(g) any other factors the court finds 
relevant. 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.2(3) (1989). On the other hand, the 
legislature did not offer any guidance to trial courts to 
assist in determining the "capability" of the parents. The 
term is not defined. Section 10.4 contains provisions for (1) 
modification of a joint legal custody order, (2) termination of 
the order discussed above, and (3) attorneys fees based on 
frivolous pleadings and harassment. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 30-3-10.4 (1989). The modification provisions appear to be a 
codification of the Hoaqe v. Hogae, 649 P.2d 51 (Utah 1982) 
bifurcated procedure used in sole custody modifications. Prior 
to adoption of this statute in 1988, the only reported Utah 
case dealing directly with an initial award of "joint custody" 
was Lembach v. Cox, supra. There,, the court stated "a custody 
arrangement, joint or otherwise, is within the broad equitable 
powers of the court." Further, the court said "[t]he fact that 
the father and the mother could not negotiate a joint custody 
arrangement demonstrates the inappropriateness of ordering 
joint custody." 639 P.2d at 200.2 
2. Other Utah reported cases involving joint custody are: 
Moody v. Moody, 715 P.2d 507 (Utah 1985) (modification hearing 
of an initial award of joint custody); Becker v. Becker, 694 
P.2d 608 (Utah 1984) (on modification hearing, it was noted 
that trial court considered joint custody but did not order it 
in initial decree). 
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Prior to 1980, a handful of states including California 
had adopted various forms of "joint custody" statutes. During 
the 1980's "joint custody" was in vogue and a second wave of 
states adopted "joint custody" statutes. Utah became the 
thirty-second state (and apparently the last) caught up in this 
wave. 2 Family Law and Practice, § 32.04 (A. Rutkin ed. 1990 & 
Supp.) (hereinafter "Fam. Law").3 
California, the acknowledged pioneer of no-fault divorce 
and joint custody, retrenched in 1988 regarding joint custody. 
California's 1979 statute contained a "presumption . . . that 
joint custody is in the best interests of a minor child where 
the parents have agreed to an award of joint custody." Cal. 
Civ. Code § 4600.5(a) (West 1979). In 1983, California amended 
its joint custody statute to include a specific definition of 
both "physical" custody and "legal" custody. The California 
Legislature recognized the need to be more specific when in 
1983 it defined joint legal custody to mean "both parents shall 
share the right and responsibility to make decisions relating 
to the health, education and welfare of the child," Cal. Civ. 
Code § 4600.5(d), and defined joint physical custody as "each 
of the parents . . . [have] significant periods of physical 
custody." Cal. Civ. Code § 4600.5(d)(5) (West 1988). A team 
3. The child custody reform of the eighties gained impetus 
from ongoing no-fault divorce legislative reform. Utah added 
"irreconcilable differences" to its list of nine fault-based 
grounds in 1987. Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-1(3)(a) (1987). "Both 
reforms took place with no public commitment or private 
initiative for the systematic assessment of the legal changes 
on patterns of custody or on child welfare. As fashions change 
and new interest groups emerge, family law is at risk of 
becoming a series of experiments that never report results in 
ways that can help inform the legislative process." Zimring, 
Foreword to Sugarman & Kay, Divorce Reform at the Crossroads, 
at viii (1990). As no-fault made divorce virtually automatic, 
fathers' groups began to protest a pro-mother bias in child 
custody decisions. At the same time, feminist groups began 
attacking legal standards which were gender-specific as 
inherently discriminatory. Then, fathers* groups turned the 
idea of gender-neutrality to their advantage in the child 
custody arena. These opposing forces set the stage for "joint 
custody" statutes based on the rationale of "equality" rather 
than "equity" and children end up taking a back seat to the 
drivers, i.e., their divorcing parents. One writer succinctly 
summed up the result: "This modern trend illustrates a move 
backward toward the more explicit treatment of children as 
property — only this time the property is to be divided 
equally." Fineman, Dominant Discourse, Professional Language, 
and Legal Change In Child Custody Decisionmaking, 101 Harv. L. 
Rev. 727, 739-40 (1988). 
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of Stanford professionals proposed the need to consider "joint 
custody1* as having a third form — the actual residential 
arrangement for the child.4 Later, a California Task Force 
recommended that existing joint custody provisions be clarified 
to indicate that no statutory presumption exists in favor of 
joint custody. In response, subsection (d) was added: 
This section establishes neither a 
preference nor a presumption for or 
against joint legal custody, joint 
physical custody, or sole custody, but 
allows the courts and the family the 
widest discretion to choose a parenting 
plan which is in the best interests of the 
child or children. 
Cal. Civ. Code § 4600(d) (West Supp. 1989). 
Coincidentally, while this appeal was pending, the 1990 
Utah Legislature substantially amended its two year-old joint 
legal custody statute deleting the "rebuttable presumption" 
favoring joint legal custody. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.2 
(1989 & Supp. 1990). However, the legislature retained its 
initial definition of "joint legal custody," section 30-3-10.1, 
and the list of seven factors courts are required to consider 
in determining the best interests of the child in the context 
of joint legal custody. Section 30-3-10.2(3)(a-g) . Also 
retained in the statute is some language regarding parental 
agreement: "The court shall, where possible, include in the 
order [joint legal custody order] the terms agreed to between 
the parties [parents]," § 30-3-10.3(2) (emphasis added), and, 
"The agreement may contain a dispute resolution procedure the 
parties agree to use . . . . " § 30-3-10.3(5) (emphasis added). 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.3 (1989)._ Our legislature's change of 
position on the "rebuttable presumption" in favor of joint 
legal custody and the 
4. "There are actually three aspects of joint custody: the 
legal custody agreement, the physical custody agreement and the 
actual residential arrangement for the child. It is important 
to investigate the three forms of joint custody separately to 
understand the implications of each for the functioning of the 
post-divorce family." Albiston, Maccoby, & Mnookin, Does Joint 
Legal Custody Matter?. Stan. L. & Pol'y Rev. 167, 168 (1990). 
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necessity of parental agreement creates confusion concerning 
the public policy basis for the joint legal custody statute. 
Utah and California appear to be the first and only states to 
retrench from a presumption in favor of joint (legal) custody 
after having adopted the presumption. Due to the paucity of 
pre-statute and absence of post-statute joint custody reported 
decisions in Utah, plus the fact that Utah's statute is not 
like that of any other state, we are left to decide an issue of 
first impression with little useful precedent. Ms. Thronson 
argues that we should apply the 1990 version of the joint legal 
custody statute, i.e., apply the amendments retroactively. We 
decline to do so. The 1990 amendments did not make a mere 
procedural change or simply clarify how the 1988 statute should 
have been understood originally. The amendments were 
substantial and substantive, thus retroactive application is 
not appropriate. See In re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364, 1369 n. 4 
(Utah 1982) . 
ANALYSIS OF JOINT LEGAL CUSTODY AWARD 
UNDER § 30-3-10.1 to -10.4 
As noted above, the majority of states have adopted 
statutes expressly authorizing some form of "joint custody" 
award. Those statutes come in four basic forms: 
1. joint custody as an option only where 
the parties petition or agree; 
2. joint custody as an option; 
3. joint custody as a presumption or 
preference; 
4. joint custody split into joint legal 
custody and joint physical custody. 
Fam. Law. § 32.06[2]. Initially, Utah combined forms 1 and 3. 
Now, Utah is form 2, but only as to joint "legal" custody. 
Here, the trial court faced Utah's initial statute with a 
favorable presumption on one hand and the requirement of 
parents' agreement on the other. Ms. Thronson opposed a joint 
custody order. The trial court failed to meet the parental 
agreement requirement head-on. Instead, the court found "there 
exists substantial difficulty between the parties" and "it is 
in the best interests of the child for the parties to be 
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awarded Joint legal custody." The court failed to find whether 
the parents agreed or disagreed as to an order of joint legal 
custody. At the time the court ruled, the statute stated: 
The court may order joint legal custody if 
it determines that: 
(a) both parents agree to an order of 
joint legal custody . . . 
§ 30-3-10.2(2)(a) (1989). 
The form of the statute required a threshold finding of 
parental "agreement." The trial court implicitly found 
"disagreement" but proceeded with the order. Moreover, the 
record reveals opposition to the order, i.e., no agreement. 
Several states have adopted the "parental agreement" form of 
joint custody statute, including Colorado, Texas and Kansas.5 
The Colorado statute, for example, requires that any motion for 
joint custody be filed by both parties, Colo. Rev. Stat. 
§ 14-10-124(5) (1973), and that any plan for joint custody must 
be jointly agreed to by the parties, Colo. Rev. Stat. 
§ 14-10-124.5(5) (1973). In Colorado, a trial court ordered 
joint custody over the objection of the mother. The appellate 
court ruled that the award in the absence of agreement of the 
parties was an abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of 
Posinoff, 683 P.2d 377, 378 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984). See also 
Gonzalez v. Gonzalez, 672 S.W.2d 887 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984)(court 
has no authority to award joint custody without agreement); 
Larsen v. Larsen, 5 Kan. App. 2d 284, 615 P.2d 806 
(1980)(without agreement, joint custody award unauthorized). 
We hold that the trial court abused its discretion by 
imposing the order of joint legal custody on the parents and 
child. The statute required parental agreement. Here, there 
was parental opposition. See Lembach v. Cox, 639 P.2d 197, 200 
(Utah 1981)(inappropriate to order joint custody where parents 
not in agreement). Thus, we vacate the order of joint legal 
custody. Due to our ruling and remand, we need not reach Ms. 
Thronson's challenge to the provision for automatic change of 
custody when one parent moves from the state. 
5. Illinois, Massachusetts, Ohio, and Wisconsin have also 
adopted similar statutes. Fam. Law § 32.06[2] at n. 45. 
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ANALYSIS OF CHILD CUSTODY 
UNDER § 30-3-10 
Our vacating of the order of joint legal custody is not 
necessarily dispositive of the issues of child custody, 
including legal custody, i.e., decision-making, and physical 
custody, i.e., caregiving and visitation rights. The trial 
court's findings might support a "best interests" custody award 
under § 30-3-10, although an award of joint legal custody was 
improper. However, both the court's memorandum decision and 
formal findings specify the court's reliance on the 
legislature's list of best interest factors in the joint legal 
custody statute § 30-3-10.2(3) enumerated above. On the other 
hand, § 30-3-10 provides: 
In determining custody, the court shall 
consider the best interests of the child and 
the past conduct and demonstrated moral 
standards of each of the parties. 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10 (1989) (emphasis added). 
Our Supreme Court has developed the best interest factors 
to be considered under this provision. 
We believe that the choice in competing 
child custody claims should instead be based 
on function-related factors- Prominent among 
these, though not exclusive, is the identity 
of the primary caretaker during the 
marriage. Other factors should include the 
identity of the parent with greater 
flexibility to provide personal care for the 
child and the identity of the parent with 
whom the child has spent most of his or her 
time pending custody determination if that 
period has been lengthy. Another important 
factor should be the stability of the 
environment provided by each parent. 
Pusev v. Pusey. 728 P.2d 117, 120 (Utah 1986) (emphasis 
added). £fi£ alsa Hutchison v. Hutchison, 649 P.2d 38, 41 (Utah 
1982); Rule 4-903(3) Utah Code of Jud. Admin. (1989) (requiring 
custody evaluators to consider and respond to a list of 
factors). 
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Our comparison of the two lists of factors reveals that 
they are not identical, although some similarities appear. 
Moreover, the context of the respective factors point the 
thrust of the trial court's inquiry in two different 
directions. As a result, the findings herein will not support 
an ultimate finding under § 30-3-10 that child custody should 
be placed with one parent or the other. Further, the findings 
contain internal disagreement. The memorandum decision states 
"the court desires the parties to arrange between themselves 
for reasonable and liberal visitation which they determine." 
To the same effect is formal finding number 61: "[i]t is in 
the best interests of the parties and their minor child to 
attempt to arrange between themselves reasonable and liberal 
visitation . . . . If the parties are unable to do so, the 
court will set a specific schedule." But, the court in formal 
finding number 65 took that promised privilege away from the 
parties stating — M[i]n light of an appropriate reasonable and 
liberal visitation schedule, it is reasonable that the parties' 
minor child will spend 57% of his time with plaintiff, who has 
primary physical custody, and 43% of his time with the 
defendant. The 57% visitation award to the mother provides 
the basis for the "primary physical custody" statement. This 
was the only time the trial court mentioned physical custody. 
This specification of visitation time surreptitiously imposed 
an award of joint physical custody upon the parties without 
proper consideration of the best interest factors under 
§ 30-3-10. We hold the findings to be inadequate to support 
any award of child custody because: 
(1) The trial court utilized best interest 
factors related to joint legal custody 
§ 30-3-10.2(3) and not the factors related to 
child custody § 30-3-10; 
(2) The findings are in conflict as to the 
determination of visitation rights, i.e., by 
the court or the parents; 
(3) The findings do not support any award of 
physical custody; and 
(4) Custody was awarded on the basis of a 
court imposed visitation time allocation. 
Our task is to act in the best interests of the child. We 
must vacate and remand the custody and visitation award. We do 
not remand simply for revision of the findings or with 
directions to modify the decree regarding these matters. 
During the interim, the facts regarding the parents and their 
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child and their relationships might have been dramatically-
changed. Further, the joint legal custody statute has been 
substantially amended. The current factual and legal 
circumstances should be examined before this matter is 
finalized. Thus, we remand for further fact finding and a new 
legal determination, utilizing whatever procedures and hearings 
the trial court deems necessary — consistent with this opinion. 
CHILD SUPPORT AWARD 
Child support will have to be reconsidered in connection 
with the above remand. Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.4 (Supp. 1990) 
reveals that the support obligation is intended to be a shared 
obligation of both parents. This obligation must be allocated 
in proportion to the parties' adjusted gross income pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.5 to -7.7. Subsection 7.5 lists the 
items of income to be included in gross income. It also lists 
two items to be subtracted from gross income to calculate 
adjusted gross income: alimony previously ordered and paid and 
child support previously ordered. Neither of those items is 
applicable here. Thus, gross income is the same as adjusted 
gross income in this case. But, the trial court failed to 
include income from nonearned sources as required by 
§ 78-45-7.5(1)(a). Moreover, the trial court averaged Mr. 
Thronson's earned income for several years rather than using 
"current earnings." Section 78-45-7.5(5)(b) indicates that 
current earnings are to be used. On remand, child support 
calculations should properly account for these items pursuant 
to the statutory requirements. 
ALIMONY AWARD 
The trial court awarded Ms. Thronson alimony of $800 per 
month for one year. Three factors must be considered by the 
trial court in making an alimony award: 
1. the financial condition and needs of the 
party seeking alimony; 
2. that party's ability to produce 
sufficient income for him or herself; and 
3. the ability of the other party to provide 
support. 
Naranio v. Naranio, 751 P.2d 1144, 1147 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) 
(citing English v, English, 565 P.2d 409, 410 (Utah 1977)). 
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"Failure to analyze the parties' circumstances in light of 
these three factors constitutes an abuse of discretion." Lfl. 
(citing Paffel v. Paffel. 732 P.2d 96, 100 (Utah 1986)). As 
long as the trial court exercises its discretion within the 
bounds and under the standards we have set and has supported 
its decision with adequate findings and conclusions, we will 
not disturb its rulings. Davis v. Davis, 749 P.2d 647, 649 
(Utah 1988). 
Here, the trial court considered each of the alimony 
factors and entered findings. Ms. Thronson's actual and 
necessary monthly living expenses were found to be $3,700. She 
presented a higher figure, but the court heard evidence 
challenging certain items and found them to be overstated. Ms. 
Thronson's current earning capacity, as a full-time pharmacist, 
was found to be $35,000 a year gross. This finding was based 
on competent evidence and represents the midpoint of an annual 
gross salary range of $31,000 to $39,000. The final factor, 
Mr. Thronson's ability to provide support, i.e., his earning 
capacity, was considered by the trial court. He submitted a 
thirteen year summary of his income. The trial court used an 
average of the last eight years, after excluding some 
contingent fee income in three of those years. Thus, the court 
found Mr. Thronson's average gross income to be $71,376 
annually. This calculation and finding was in error. Mr. 
Thronson's schedule showed his current gross earning capacity 
to be $94,476 annually. Nevertheless, we cannot say that an 
award of $800 per month in alimony is an abuse of discretion 
given the above factors and other financial circumstances of 
the parties. But, we do hold that the trial court abused its 
discretion in making the alimony non-permanent, i.e., for one 
year. 
The trial court found that "an annual income of $35,000 
should be imputed" to Ms. Thronson, i.e., she could earn that 
amount, assuming she was employed on a full-time basis. But, 
the court found her needs to be $3,700 per month, i.e., $44,400 
annually. Accordingly, she is not capable of meeting her 
needs, she requires $9,400 annually to meet her needs, even 
when employed on a full-time basis. Thus, she will require 
the $800 per month ($9,600 annually) alimony for the forseeable 
future. Otherwise, she will face a substantial income 
shortfall compared to her needs. Further, the trial court 
found Mr. Thronson1s actual and necessary monthly living 
expenses to be $4,300 per month, i.e., $51,600 annually. This 
leaves him with some discretionary income. These findings 
warrant an award of permanent alimony. The trial court abused 
its discretion in limiting the alimony award to one year. 
Rasband v. Rasband. 752 P.2d 1331, 1335 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
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We remand for modification of the alimony award to be permanent 
alimony of $800 per month. 
OTHER FINANCIAL AND 
PROPERTY AWARDS 
There is no fixed formula upon which to determine a 
division of property in a divorce action. The trial court has 
considerable latitude in adjusting financial and property 
interests, and its actions are entitled to a presumption of 
validity. See Naranio, 751 P.2d at 1146. Ms. Thronson claims 
the trial court erred by failing to restore to her inheritance 
monies expended by her while the parties were separated prior 
to divorce; by failing to replace certain furniture removed by 
Mr. Thronson; and by failing to restore certain funds spent by 
Mr. Thronson after they separated. We have examined these 
items and find no abuse of trial court discretion. This court 
will not disturb a determination of financial and property 
interests unless it is clearly unjust or a clear abuse of 
discretion. Rasband, 752 P.2d at 1335. Thus, we affirm the 
rulings on these matte^J. * 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
t^c»» C'erK 
MARY M. THRONSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CHARLES H. THRONSON, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CIVIL NO. D-87-4318 
The above-entitled matter came on for trial on the 25th of 
April, 1989, and continued for three days thereafter. The 
plaintiff was represented by her attorneys Paul H. Liapis and 
Helen Christian, and the defendant was represented by his 
attorney Clark W. Sessions. The Court heard testimony from the 
parties and their respective witnesses, received exhibits, and 
following trial received each party's proposal for distribution 
of the marital estate and ruling on the other issues in dispute. 
The Court now being advised in the premises, renders this 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
1. Jurisdiction 
The Court finds that the above-entitled Court has 
jurisdiction. The parties were residents of Salt Lake County for 
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more than three months immediately preceding the filing of this 
cause of action and Answer and Counterclaim. 
2. Grounds 
The Court finds that each party has stated sufficient facts 
to establish grounds upon which the Decree may be granted on the 
basis of irreconcilable differences. 
3. Custody 
The Court finds each parent to be fit and proper for an 
award of custody and that while there exists substantial 
difficulty between the parties, consistent with the intent and 
language of Section 30-3-10.2, Utah Code Ann. (1988), it is in 
the best interests of the child Patrick Thronson for the parties 
to be awarded joint legal custody. The Court finds that both 
parents are capable of implementing joint legal custody. 
The Court has reviewed each of the aspects of paragraph 3 
(a) through (g) of Section 30-3-10.2, Utah Code Ann., and finds 
that the factors there stated exist in the relationship of each 
of the parties to their son Patrick that this joint legal custody 
determination is appropriate under the circumstances. 
Further, the Court finds that it is in the best interests of 
the child that each parent remain in Utah in a proximity 
sufficiently close to Patrick that the joint custody and close 
parental relationship may continue. If either parent determines 
to leave the state of Utah, it is the Courts considered opinion, 
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at this time, that custody should transfer to the remaining 
parent so that minimal disruption to Patrick would occur. 
4. Visitation 
Consistent with the Court's ruling that joint custody be the 
status, the Court desires the parties to arrange between 
themselves for reasonable and liberal visitation which they 
determine. In the event either party is unable to agree with an 
informal but liberal schedule, the Court will set a specific 
schedule. However, in advance the Court would indicate that it 
prefers the parties to arrange the ongoing relationship 
consistent with Patrick's best interest. 
5. Alimony and Child Support 
The Court finds that each party is an able-bodied person, 
capable of earning sufficient income to support themselves. The 
plaintiff is a licensed pharmacist, able to find employment on a 
part-time and full-time basis at hourly rates between $15.00 and 
over $19.00 per hour, which would yield an annual income between 
$31,000.00 and over $39,000.00. Even though Patrick is in school 
full-time and can be cared for at the school at nominal cost, the 
plaintiff has continued to work only part-time. The Court finds 
this choice to be inconsistent with the plaintiff's financial 
needs, but certainly a choice the plaintiff may elect to make. 
Considering all of the asset division and income sources from the 
property division, the Court believes alimony should be set on a 
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transitional basis, and sets the same in the amount of $800.00 
per month for a period of one year, beginning in May of 1989 and 
concluding in April of 1990. Thereafter, alimony shall 
terminate. 
Child support shall be set above the level of the child 
support obligation worksheet as compared to that worksheet set by 
the legislature to become effective July 1, and that support 
shall be set at the level of $900.00 per month. 
6. Life Insurance 
The defendant has agreed to and the Court affirms the naming 
of a corporate fiduciary as the beneficiary to an unfunded life 
insurance trust, which trust shall maintain a policy currently 
available to the defendant through his employment in the amount 
of $200,000.00, and which policy shall never during the child's 
minority be less than the present value of the unpaid child 
support obligations of the defendant. The trustee should be a 
corporate fiduciary disinterested in the family of either party. 
7. Medical Insurance 
The defendant shall be ordered to maintain the child Patrick 
on his medical insurance and cooperate in all respects in the 
presentation of claims. Portions not covered by the medical 
insurance shall be borne equally by the parties. 
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8. Real and Personal Property Distribution 
The Court finds the real and personal property should be 
divided between the parties as follows: 
TO THE PLAINTIFF MARY M. THRONSON: 
(a) The residence at 2063 Hubbard Avenue, subject to 
the plaintiff's payment of the unpaid mortgage; 
(b) The 1986 Mercedes; 
(c) All furniture, furnishings, fixtures, etc. 
contained in the home at this time; 
(d) A portion of value in the retirement plan at 
Parsons, Behle & Latimer in the present value amount of 
$105,000.00; 
(e) The plaintiff is further entitled to one-half of 
the pro rata annual contribution to be made to the 
retirement plan to cover any period prior to May 1, 1989 
whenever that contribution is made; 
(f) The IRA at Continental Bank; 
(g) The Western Mutual annuity; 
(h) The Dual Asset Fund #V; 
(i) The two First Security accounts presently utilized 
by the plaintiff; 
(j) One-half of the account in the trust fund at 
Sessions & Moore; 
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(k) $2,002.00 as a cash payment from the defendant to 
compensate for the defendant's value represented in the 
Parsons, Behle & Latimer stock; 
(1) All other personal clothing, apparel, effects, 
objets d'art, etc. currently in the plaintiff's possession 
not otherwise dealt with. 
TO THE DEFENDANT IS AWARDED THE FOLLOWING: 
(a) The residence at 1940 South 2500 East, purchased 
with separate inherited funds; 
(b) The 1986 Toyota Landcruiser; 
(c) The 1983 Honda XR500R; the 1986 Honda XLV750R; the 
three bike trailer; 
(d) All furniture, furnishings, fixtures and 
appliances currently in the possession of the defendant; 
(e) All office furniture located both at the 
defendant's residence and PB&L office; 
(f) All PB&L stock; 
(g) One-half of the Sessions and Moore trust account 
funds; 
(h) The Valley Bank account utilized by the defendant; 
(i) The remainder of the retirement plan at Parsons, 
Behle & Latimer; 
(j) The Zions Bank IRA; 
(k) The Aetna annuity; 
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(1) All personal effects, clothing, apparel, objets 
d'art, etc. currently in the possession of the defendant. 
9. Debts and Obligations of the Parties 
The Court finds that the parties should be individually 
responsible for the following debts and obligations: 
(a) The plaintiff shall be responsible for the unpaid 
mortgage on the residence at 2 063 Hubbard Avenue; the Nordstromfs 
account; ZCMI account; bill due to Naomi Maddis; Key Bank Visa 
card balance; First Security Bank Quickline balance; Zions First 
National Bank loan balance; First Security Bank Visa balance; and 
any and all other liabilities incurred by the plaintiff since 
separation not otherwise dealt with directly herein. 
(b) The defendant shall be responsible for the unpaid 
mortgage on the residence at 1940 South 2500 East; the R.C 
Willey account; the MBNA Mastercard account; First Security Bank 
account; SL Family Therapy account; Valley Bank Visa card 
account; the balance due on the 1988 taxes; and any and all other 
obligations incurred by the defendant since separation not 
otherwise dealt with. 
10. Payment of Attorney's Fees 
The Court finds that each party should be responsible for 
payment of their own attorney's fees as incurred, with the 
exception that the defendant should pay toward the plaintiff's 
attorney's fees the sum of $5,000.00. 
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11. Education costs to Patrick 
The defendant should be responsible for tuition costs for 
Patrick's attendance at Rowland Hall through the 6th grade, 
however, this may be re-evaluated upon the occurrence of either 
or both of the following: 
(a) The tuition costs increase more than 30% over 
present levels; or 
(b) The defendant's income decreases by more than 30% 
over present levels. 
It is anticipated that after the 6th grade, the parties will 
determine the future education as to Patrick, and the defendant 
will, as reasonably possible, maintain a significant contribution 
to that future cost. 
12. Restoration of Maiden Name 
The plaintiff shall be restored to her maiden name of Mary 
Elizabeth Moriarty. 
13. Counseling for Patrick 
If counseling for Patrick is continued, each party shall 
bear one-half of the cost. 
14. Other Matters. 
The Court has endeavored to deal with all issues and 
property in dispute. However, the evidence involved many items 
and was presented in such a way that some matters may have been 
overlooked. Counsel are invited, without the invitation to retry 
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the case, to inform the Court of such matters, if any, overlooked 
or in need of clarification. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MARY THRONSON, : 
: FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
Plaintiff, : CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
vs. : 
CHARLES THRONSON, : Civil No. D87-4318 
Defendant. : Judge David S. Young 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial 
on the 25th day of April, 1989, and continued thereafter for 
three days before the Honorable David S. Young, one of the Judges 
of the above-entitled Court. The Plaintiff was present in person 
and was represented by Paul H. Liapis and Helen Christian of 
Gustin, Green, Stegall & Liapis, her attorneys. The Defendant 
was present in person and was represented by his attorney, Clark 
W. Session of Sessions & Moore. The Court heard the evidence 
adduced, reviewed and considered the issues and stipulations 
presented and, after taking the matter under advisement rendered 
its Memorandum Decision on the 9th day of May, 1989, and being 
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fully advised in the premises, does now make and adopt the 
following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
FINDINGS REGARDING DECREE OF DIVORCE 
1. The Court finds that both of the parties were 
residents of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, for a period in 
excess of three (3) months prior to the commencement of the 
above-entitled action. 
2. The Court finds that the Plaintiff and Defendant 
were married on September 30, 1978. Plaintiff filed her Com-
plaint for Divorce on November 2, 1987 and the parties were 
thereafter separated in February, 1988. 
3. The Court finds that there is one child born as 
the issue of the marriage, Patrick Thronson, age 7^ years. 
4. The Court finds that significant differences and 
disputes arose between the parties during their marriage as to 
their relationship with each other and that such differences 
became irreconcilable and further, that while various attempts at 
counseling and reconciliation were undertaken by the respective 
parties, such were to no avail, making continuation of the 
marriage under the circumstances impossible. The Court further 
finds that the Decree of Divorce to be entered herein should 
become final upon its entry as by law provided. 
FINDINGS REGARDING ALIMONY 
5. The Court finds that Plaintiff has been employed 
in her profession as a Pharmacist, in either a full-time or 
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part-time capacity, during the majority of the marriage of the 
parties. The Court in addition finds that Plaintiff has pursued 
graduate studies in Pharmacy through the College of Pharmacy at 
the University of Utah. 
6. The Court finds that Plaintiff is currently 
employed at the Intermountain Poison Control Center at the 
University of Utah, on a part-time basis. 
7. The Court finds that employment opportunities 
exist for the Plaintiff in the field of retail or hospital 
pharmacy on a full-time or part-time basis, at hourly rates 
between $15.00 and over $19.00 per hour, which would yield an 
annual gross income between $31,000.00 and in excess of 
$39,000.00 on a full-time basis. 
8. The Court finds that the Plaintiff is an 
able-bodied person, with an undergraduate and graduate profes-
sional education and considerable work experience, who is fully 
capable of earning sufficient income to support herself. 
9. The Court finds that the parties1 minor child, 
Patrick, is in first grade and is a full-time student at Rowland 
Hall St. Mark's School, and that child care for other than school 
hours is available for Patrick at his school at a nominal cost. 
10. The Court finds that, despite the foregoing, 
Plaintiff has voluntarily chosen to work only on a part-time 
basis, a choice which the Court finds to be inconsistent with 
Plaintifffs actual financial needs. 
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11. The Court finds that Plaintiff has over-stated her 
actual necessary monthly living expenses and further finds the 
same to be $ 3] 7fr0 --^. The Court further finds, that 
Defendant's actvfal necessary monthly living expenses total 
UD crv QW $ ^660-^ per month. 
12. The Court finds that Plaintiff's actual necessary 
monthly living expenses represent an amount which is consistent 
with the historical earnings of the parties during the course of 
their marriage and which is not based upon one or two years of 
inordinately high monthly living expenses based upon inordinately 
high income during such years. 
13. The Court finds that the necessary monthly living 
expenses presented by Plaintiff at trial to be exaggerated and 
not in accord with the historical earnings of the parties nor the 
weight of the other evidence adduced at trial. 
14. The Court finds that the evidence indicates that 
rather than seeking to obtain gainful full-time employment, 
Plaintiff has instead sought to avoid full-time employment by 
utilizing the temporary support and maintenance ordered to be 
provided by Defendant, utilizing one of two annuities which the 
parties were receiving, and by utilizing funds from a separate 
inheritance which Plaintiff had received after the death of a 
family member. 
15. The Court finds that an annual income of 
$35,000.00 (representing the midpoint between $31,000.00 and 
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$39,000.00 which the Court finds Plaintiff is capable of earning 
on a full-time basis) should be imputed to Plaintiff by reason of 
her voluntary choice to work only part-time, for purposes of 
consideration and computation of alimony, and for purposes of 
consideration and computation of child support. 
16. The Court finds that while the Plaintiff is able 
to provide for her own support and maintenance, an award of 
alimony on a transitional basis is appropriate under the facts 
and circumstances of this case, which amount the Court finds to 
be $800.00 per month to commence June 1, 1989, and to conclude on 
May 1, 1990, following which alimony shall cease and terminate, 
17. The Court finds that it is likely Plaintiff will 
be able to obtain, as a fringe benefit, health, accident, hospi-
talization and dental insurance coverage through full-time 
employment as a licensed Pharmacist in the State of Utah, or in 
the alternative that Plaintiff may be able to arrange for indi-
vidual insurance coverage after she is removed as a named insured 
from Defendant's insurance plan through his employment. Accord-
ingly, the Court finds that Defendant is not required to maintain 
health or other insurance coverage for the benefit of Plaintiff 
after entry of the Decree of Divorce herein. 
18. The Court finds that the Defendant is employed 
full-time as an attorney in a Salt Lake City law firm, and that 
during the time period 1981 thru the date of trial hereof Defen-
dant has been a shareholder in the law firm and has been paid a 
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salary and quarterly bonuses on a fairly regular basis, although 
no bonus has been paid to him for certain quarters, including the 
first quarter of 1989. The Court finds that Defendant's annual 
gross earnings, including salary and quarterly bonuses, during 
the time Defendant has been a shareholder at the law firm, have 
averaged $71,373 per annum. 
19. The Court finds that on only five occasions over 
the past 12 years in which Defendant has been practicing law, 
Defendant has received additional contingent fee origination 
income from law firm contingent fee cases on which the Defendant 
has worked. The Court specifically finds that contingent fee 
origination income to Defendant from the law firm's contingent 
fees cases was paid in 1984 and in 1986, with an additional 
payment made for tax purposes in 1987 on a contingent fee case 
which the law firm actually settled in 1986. The Court finds in 
addition that this contingent fee origination income is unpre-
dictable, irregular and rare and has not been and should not be 
considered to be part of regular or reasonably expected salary or 
bonus income for purposes of alimony consideration or computa-
tion, or for purposes of child support consideration or 
computation, 
20. The Court finds that the Plaintiff has previously 
enjoyed the benefits of the contingent fee origination income 
paid to Defendant from the law firm's contingent fee cases, which 
enjoyment was in the form of travel, additional purchases, 
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property, investments, pension and profit sharing contributions 
and the like, much of which inures to the benefit of the Plain-
tiff in the division of property set forth below. Through these 
cases, the parties have also obtained two annuity contracts, the 
larger of which contracts in terms of total payout is awarded to 
Plaintiff as hereinafter set forth. 
21. The Court finds that there is no evidence to 
support any claim to any interest in any existing or future 
contingent fee contracts between the law firm and the clients of 
the law firm, nor has any legal authority to support any such 
claim been presented. The Court further finds that, because such 
contingent fee contracts on such cases are the property of the 
law firm and because any such future income would be uncertain, 
hypothetical and/or speculative at best, there is no factual or 
legal basis for any such award in this case. 
FINDINGS REGARDING PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM FOR 
"EQUITABLE RESTITUTION11 
22. The Court finds that the Plaintiff had completed 
her undergraduate and graduate education at Creighton University 
in Omaha, Nebraska in 1977, prior to the marriage of the parties. 
Plaintiff had been awarded her professional degree in Pharmacy, 
had become licensed as a Pharmacist in the State of Utah and had 
commenced employment in her profession as a Pharmacist on a 
full-time basis prior to the marriage of the parties. 
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23. The Court finds that the cost of Plaintiffs 
professional education was financed in part by her parents and in 
part from bank, university and student loans, some of which were 
repaid by the Defendant but most of which were paid either by her 
parents or by Plaintiff. 
24. The Court finds that Plaintiff was employed on 
either a full-time or part-time basis throughout the majority of 
the marriage of the parties and that Defendant encouraged and 
supported Plaintiff's employment. The Court further finds that 
the Plaintiff attended in addition a graduate program in Pharmacy 
at the College of Pharmacy, University of Utah for approximately 
six months, which course of study Defendant encouraged. 
25. The Court finds that the Defendant had completed 
his undergraduate education at the University of Washington, and 
his graduate education at the School of Law at Creighton Univer-
sity in Omaha, Nebraska, prior to the marriage of the parties. 
Defendant received his Juris Doctor degree in 1977, also prior to 
the marriage of the parties. 
26. The Court further finds that the Defendant's 
education in both undergraduate and graduate school was financed 
by Defendant's own efforts, by scholarships which Defendant had 
obtained and by contributions by Defendant's grandparents, and 
that Plaintiff did not contribute either financial or other 
support to the completion of Defendant's education. 
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27. The Court finds that the Defendant had secured 
employment as an attorney in a Salt Lake City, Utah law firm and 
became licensed to practice law in the State of Utah as a result 
of his own efforts and without financial or other contribution or 
assistance from the Plaintiff, all prior to the marriage of the 
parties, 
28. The Court finds that the parties voluntarily and 
independently chose their own professions and independently 
pursued and secured graduate degrees, professional licensing and 
employment in their respective professions without assistance or 
contribution from the other, excepting some contribution by 
Defendant to Plaintiff's loan repayment, as hereinabove set 
forth. 
29. The Court finds that Plaintiff has not provided a 
significant, substantial or unusual level of support or assis-
tance to Defendant's professional career, apart from that typi-
cally provided by a professional working spouse, nor has Plain-
tiff made significant, substantial or unusual sacrifices with 
respect to her own professional employment, education or other 
achievements in deference to or in support of Defendant's profes-
sional career. 
30. The Court finds that Plaintiff has not suffered a 
reduction of wages during the course of the marriage of the 
parties as a result of Defendant's employment, or as a result of 
any conduct or requirement of Defendant, nor does the Court find 
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evidence to support Plaintiff's claim that she has sacrificed or 
lost wages during the course of the marriage, or failed to pursue 
her career on a full-time basis, as a result of any imposition by 
Defendant upon Plaintiff, or as a result of the requirements of 
Defendant's employment. 
31. The Court finds that the Defendant has not worked 
excessive or lengthy hours during the day, or at night or on 
weekends, nor has the Defendant spent an excessive or unusual 
amount time out of town pursuant to his employment. 
32. The Court therefore finds that, based upon the 
testimony and other evidence adduced herein, there is no factual 
or legal basis to support an award to the Plaintiff of any amount 
under the doctrine of "equitable restitution." 
FINDINGS REGARDING DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY 
33. The Court finds that much of the personal property 
of the parties was carefully valued and divided by the parties, 
by mutual consent and agreement and without duress, after the 
parties had separated. The Court further finds that Plaintiff 
voluntarily agreed to and assented to this property distribution 
by herself writing out one of the pages of the distribution 
memoranda and by initialing or signing each of the remaining 
pages thereof and the Court finds in addition that her claim that 
such was done under duress is not suported by the evidence. 
34. The Court finds the property distribution agreed 
to between the parties to be reasonable and appropriate. 
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Accordingly, the Court adopts the property distribution agreement 
of the parties, with respect to the property it covers, and 
further adopts those values placed upon the property by the 
parties as the most accurate values of such property to the 
extent that values were not placed upon certain of the property 
by the parties at the time such was divided and distributed, the 
Court finds that the values placed upon the remaining property, 
by Defendant, are fair and reasonable. The property valuation 
and distribution is attached hereto as Appendix A and by this 
reference incorporated herein and made a part hereof. 
35. The remaining real and personal property acquired 
by the parties during the course of their marriage should be 
valued as set forth in Appendix Bf which values the Court finds 
to be reasonable, and divided as follows: 
TO THE PLAINTIFF MARY M. THRONSON: 
(a) The residence at 2063 Hubbard Avenue, subject 
to the Plaintiff's payment of the unpaid mortgage and all costs 
and expenses associated with the residence; 
(b) The parties1 1986 Mercedes Benz; 
(c) All furniture, furnishing, fixtures and 
personal property contained in the residence at 2063 Hubbard 
Avenue at this time; 
(d) A portion of the value of the Defendant's 
interest in the Retirement Plan at Parsons, Behle & Latimer in 
the present value amount of $105,000.00, constituting 
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approximately one-half of Defendant's Retirement Plan interest 
minus Defendant's fifty percent share of the equity in the 
residence at 2063 Hubbard Avenue. 
(e) One-half of the prorated annual contribution 
to be made to the Retirement Plan for the benefit of the Defen-
dant to cover any period prior to May 1, 1989, whenever that 
contribution is made; 
(f) The Plaintiff's IRA at Continental Bank; 
(g) The parties* Western National annuity; 
(h) The parties' Dual Asset Fund V; 
(i) The two First Security Bank accounts pres-
ently utilized by the Plaintiff; 
(j) One-half of the account held in trust for the 
parties' benefit at Sessions & Moore, which account represents 
certain salary and bonus amounts earned by Defendant and ordered 
temporarily escrowed by the Court; 
(k) $2,002.00 as a cash payment from the Defen-
dant to compensate Plaintiff for the actual value represented in 
the Defendant's stock in the law firm of Parsons, Behle & 
Latimer; 
(1) All other personal clothing, apparel, 
effects, objets d'art, and other personal property currently in 
the Plaintiff's possession and not otherwise dealt with herein. 
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TO THE DEFENDANT CHARLES H. THRONSON: 
(a) The residence of the Defendant located at 
1940 South 2500 East, which he purchased with separate inherited 
funds; 
(b) The parties' 1986 Toyota Land Cruiser; 
(c) The parties' 1983 Honda XR-500R; 
(d) The parties' 1986 Honda XLV-750R; 
(e) The parties' utility trailer; 
(f) All furniture, furnishings, fixtures and 
appliances currently in possession of the Defendant; 
(g) All office furniture located both at 
Defendant's residence and at the Parsons, Behle & Latimer office; 
(h) All stock in the law firm of Parsons, Behle & 
Latimer; 
(i) One-half of the account held in trust for the 
benefit of the parties' at Session & Moore, which account repre-
sents certain salary and bonus amounts earned by Defendant and 
ordered temporarily escrowed by the Court; 
(j) The Valley Bank account presently utilized by 
the Defendant; 
(k) The remainder of Defendant's interest in the 
Retirement Plan at Parsons, Behle & Latimer; 
(1) The Defendant's IRA at Zions Bank; 
(m) The parties' Aetna annuity; 
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(n) All personal effects, clothing, apparel, 
objets d'art, and other personal property currently in the 
possession of the Defendant• 
36. The Court finds that Plaintiff should assume, pay, 
discharge and hold the Defendant harmless from the following 
debts and obligations incurred during the course of the marriage 
of the parties, and since their separation, in the approximate 
values set forth on Appendix B. 
(a) The unpaid mortgage on the parties1 residence 
at 2063 Hubbard Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah; 
(b) Nordstrom's accounts; 
(c) ZCMI accounts; 
(d) Bills due to Noami Maddis for services 
rendered; 
(e) Key Bank Visa card balance; 
(f) First Security Bank Quickline balance; 
(g) Zions First National Bank loan balance; 
(h) First Security Bank Visa balance; and 
(i) Any and all other liabilities incurred by the 
Plaintiff since separation not otherwise dealt with directly 
herein. 
37. The Court finds that Defendant should assume, pay, 
discharge and hold the Plaintiff harmless from the following 
debts and obligations incurred during the course of the marriage 
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of the parties, and since their separation, in the approximate 
values set forth on Appendix B. 
(a) The unpaid mortgage on his residence at 1940 
South 2500 East; 
(b) RC Willey account; 
(c) MBNA Master Card account; 
(d) First Security Bank account; 
(e) Salt Lake Child and Family Therapy account; 
(f) Valley Bank Visa card account; 
(g) Any remaining balance due on the 1988 state 
and federal income taxes of the parties; and 
(h) Any and all other obligations incurred by the 
Defendant since separation not otherwise dealt with. 
38. The Court finds that the parties had each received 
separate inheritances, which they have each kept separate from, 
and not commingled with, the joint assets of the parties. The 
Court further finds that the parties have stipulated that their 
inheritances should remain their sole and separate property. 
39. The Court finds that both of the parties have 
expended funds from their inheritances, and the Court finds 
specifically that the Plaintiff has expended a considerable 
portion of her separate inheritance funds to pay her expenses in 
lieu of seeking gainful full-time employment. 
40. Under the circumstances, and in light of the 
distribution of property and other assets to Plaintiff herein, 
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the Court finds it inappropriate to require Defendant to reim-
burse Plaintiff her separate inheritance funds which Plaintiff 
voluntarily chose to expend on herself prior to the divorce of 
the parties. 
41. The Court finds that the parties purchased furni-
ture during the course of their marriage, and inherited other 
furniture primarily from Defendant's family. The Court further 
finds that most of the purchased furniture was distributed by the 
parties to the Plaintiff and most of the inherited furniture was 
distributed by the parties to the Defendant, in accordance with 
their mutual desires. 
42. The Court finds that the Plaintiff has enjoyed the 
benefit and use of the inherited furniture during the course of 
the marriage of the parties, allowing the parties to expend their 
funds on goods and services other than furniture. The Court 
further finds that, because of this advantageous use, and because 
of the mutual agreement to value and distribute the furniture as 
between the parties, that Plaintiff's request that Defendant 
purchase additional furniture for Plaintiff should be denied. 
43. The Court finds that, during the course of the 
marriage of the parties, Defendant was generally responsible for 
the handling of family finances and made various expenditures and 
investments on behalf of the family for the benefit of the 
family, including Plaintiff. The Court finds that there is no 
evidence that Defendant wasted, hid, misappropriated or 
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improperly expended any of the funds acquired by the parties 
during their marriage. The Court instead finds that, such 
expenditures and investments made by the Defendant on behalf of 
the family were legitimate and appropriate. Therefore, the Court 
finds that Plaintiff's request that she be paid one-half of 
certain of the funds expended by the Defendant for the benefit of 
the family during the course of the marriage should be denied. 
44. The Plaintiff has stipulated that she is not 
requesting any interest of Defendant in the law firm of Parsons, 
Behle & Latimer, or Defendant's employment therewith, except for 
an award of the value of one-half of the shares of stock which 
Defendant owns therein, which value is awarded to Plaintiff as 
hereinabove se forth above, and that no additional interest 
exists that should be awarded. 
FINDINGS OF FACT REGARDING CUSTODY AND VISITATION 
45. The Court finds that the independent custody 
evaluation and recommendation completed in this case represent a 
thorough, accurate and complete assessment of the custodial 
issues in this case, and that the same to the extent not incon-
sistent herewith are incorporated herein and made a part hereof. 
The independent custody evaluation report is attached hereto as 
Appendix C. 
46. The Court finds each of the parties to be fit and 
proper persons to justify an award of custody of their minor 
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child, Patrick Thronson, to them, and that while there has 
•previously existed some difficulty between the parties them-
selves, the Court finds that it is in the best interests of the 
parties' minor child, for the parties to be awarded joint legal 
custody. 
47. The Court notes that pursuant to the provisions of 
Utah Code Ann. S 30-3-10.2(1) (1988) there is a rebuttable 
presumption that joint legal custody is in the best interests of 
a minor child, and the Court finds that, based upon the testimony 
and other evidence adduced herein, that presumption is operative 
and has not been rebutted. 
48. The Court finds that Defendant has sought and 
agreed to an order of joint legal custody. To date, the Plain-
tiff has been resistant to an order of joint legal custody. 
However, it appears to the Court that Plaintiff's resistance is 
based upon both a lack of recognition of the importance of the 
relationship between Defendant and the minor child of the par-
ties, and upon Plaintiff's own previously-expressed desire to 
leave the State of Utah with the minor child of the parties. 
49. The Court finds that based upon the language and 
clear intent of said statute, upon the inherent power of this 
Court to act and to make orders in the best interests of the 
minor child of the parties, and under the circumstances presented 
herein, the Court finds that it is not required that the 
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Plaintiff agree to an order of joint legal custody before the 
Court can enter an order requiring the same. 
50. The Court finds that both parents are capable of 
implementing joint legal custody, and that the parties have 
worked together and cooperated with respect to issues related to 
their minor child during the approximately 1 1/2-year elapse of 
time between the filing of the Complaint for Divorce by Plaintiff 
and the trial of the case. 
51. This finding is also made and predicated upon the 
testimony of the counselor and therapist for Patrick, who also 
testified that the parties had worked together very well with 
respect to decisions related to the health, welfare and education 
of Patrick during this same period. 
52. The Court further specifically finds that, while 
Plaintiff has claimed that she is not capable of implementing 
joint legal custody because of alleged past incidents of "physi-
cal" and "verbal" abuse, the Court finds those allegations to be 
unsupported by the weight of the credible testimony herein. 
53. The Court specifically finds that joint legal 
custody is in the best interests of the minor child of the 
parties pursuant to Utah Code Ann. S 30-3-10.2(3). This finding 
is made and predicated upon the following specific findings of 
fact on this issue: 
(a) The Court specifically finds that it is clear 
that the physical, psychological and emotional needs and 
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development of Patrick will benefit from joint legal custody. 
The Court further finds that the minor child of the parties has a 
close and nuturing relationship with both parents and that, based 
inter alia upon the independent custody evaluation and testimony, 
and the other testimony adduced herein, both parents have made 
substantial contributions throughout the life of the child to 
jointly support his needs and will continue to do so in the 
future. 
(b) The Court specifically finds that both 
parents have demonstrated the ability, both during their marriage 
and after their separation, to give first priority to the welfare 
of their minor child, and both parties have demonstrated an 
ability to reach shared decisions in the child's best interests. 
The decisions include but are not limited to selection of and 
enrollment of their child in Rowland Hall St. Mark's School, 
selection and utilization of a counselor for him, coordinating 
work, vacation and holiday schedules, and the like. 
(c) The Court specifically finds that both 
parents are capable of encouraging and accepting a positive 
relationship between their child and the other parent. The Court 
finds that while there is some question as to whether Plaintiff 
completely understands and acknowledges the close relationship 
between their child and Defendant, Plaintiff has the capability 
of encouraging and accepting that relationship. 
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(d) The Court specifically finds that both 
parents have jointly participated to a substantial degree in the 
intellectual and emotional development of Patrick, including his 
basic care requirements, education, nutrition, transportation, 
outside and recreational activities, spiritual development, 
friendships and the like. The Court further finds that both 
parents appear to recognize the child's needs and requirements, 
and both parents have worked to fulfill those needs and 
requirements. 
(e) The Court specifically finds that the resi-
dence of the Plaintiff, at 2065 Hubbard Avenue in Salt Lake City 
is in close geographic proximity to the residence of Defendant, 
at 1940 South 2500 East in Salt Lake City. The Court further 
finds that this close geographical proximity has been an impor-
tant factor in minimizing the effects upon their child of the 
separation and divorce of the parties. 
(f) The Court also specifically finds the follow-
ing as relevant factors supporting joint legal custody as being 
in the best interest of the parties minor child: 
(i) the high intellectual and educational 
achievements of the parties, which the Court finds will likely be 
conducive to establishing a mature and amicable joint legal 
custody relationship; 
(ii) both parties have continued to obtain 
counseling to understand and resolve within themselves the 
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problems in their relationship, which the Court finds will likely 
foster continued cooperation in working out custody arrangements; 
(iii) both parties are very close to their 
child, and both parties place him in a priority position in their 
lives. The Court finds in addition that this attachment and 
concern will likely assist to reduce or minimize any negative 
feelings which the parties may have about certain aspects of 
their past relationship; and 
(iv) Those other factors, not set forth 
above, favoring joint legal custody as articulated by the testi-
mony and report of the independent custody evaluator. 
54. The Court finds that its determination of the best 
interests of the child as set forth above is by a preponderance 
of the evidence, and is based upon the weight of the credible 
testimony and other evidence adduced herein, pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. S 30-3-10.2(4) (1988). 
55. The Court informs both parties, pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. S 30-3-10.2(5) (1988) that an order for joint custody 
may preclude eligibility for public assistance in the form of aid 
to families with dependent children, and that if public assis-
tance is required for the support of children of the parties at 
any time subsequent to an order of joint legal custody, the order 
may be terminated under Utah Code Ann. S 30-3-10.4 (1988). 
56. The Court finds, recommends and will order that 
the parties attempt to settle future disputes by a dispute 
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resolution method, such as a jointly acceptable psychologist or 
social worker acting as an independent mediator, before seeking 
Judicial enforcement or modification of the terms and conditions 
of the Order of Joint Legal Custody, except in actual emergency 
situations, if any, requiring ex parte orders to protect the 
parties1 minor child. 
57. The Court finds that at various times prior to and 
during the pendency of this action, Plaintiff has expressed a 
desire to permanently remove the minor child of the parties from 
the State of Utah. The Court specifically finds that it is 
clearly in the best interests of the parties' minor child that 
the child remain in the State of Utah in a proximity sufficiently 
close to each parent that the joint legal custody and close 
parental relationships may continue. In addition, the Court 
bases its finding, inter alia, upon the fact that the minor child 
of the parties was born and has lived his entire life in the 
State of Utah; that he currently is enrolled in Rowland Hall St. 
Mark's School, a private academic institution, where he has 
excelled and thrived; that he has developed friendships and 
participated in activities in the State of Utah which have 
contributed to his overall growth and development; that he has 
very strong and close relationships with both parents; and that 
he has essential psychological and emotional needs and require-
ments which can only be fulfilled by close physical proximity to 
and close contact with both parents. 
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58. The Court further specifically finds that it would 
be in the best interests of Patrick to remain in the State of 
Utah in close physical proximity to both parents, and that 
permanent removal of the child from the State of Utah by either 
party would cause very severe psychological, mental and emotional 
trauma, suffering and injury to the child. Accordingly, the 
Court finds it to be in the best interests of the child to 
restrict the parties from permanently removing him from the State 
of Utah, and the Court further specifically finds that it is in 
the best interests of the child that each of the parties reside 
in Salt Lake County in a proximity sufficiently close that the 
joint legal custody and close parental relationships with him may 
continue. 
59. The Court finds that if either party determines to 
permanently remove the parties' minor child from the State of 
Utah, sole physical and legal custody should transfer to the 
remaining parent so that minimal disruption to the child would 
occur, and the Court further finds that such would be in the best 
interests of the minor child of the parties. 
60. The Court finds that it is in the best interests 
of the minor child of the parties that the Court set forth the 
terms of its Order of Joint Legal Custody pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. S 30-3-10.3 (1988). This Order of Joint Legal Custody is 
attached hereto and incorporated herein as Appendix D. The Court 
finds and instructs the parties that they are to utilize the 
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terms of this Order in their broadest and most inclusive sense, 
and to utilize the spirit of the terms of the Order in clarifying 
or resolving any disagreements or areas of reasonable uncertainty 
between them. 
61. The Court finds that it is in the best interests 
of the parties and their minor child to attempt to arrange 
between themselves reasonable and liberal visitation consistent 
with their minor child's best interests. If the parties are 
unable to do so, the Court will set a specific schedule. 
62. The Court finds that the income imputed to the 
Plaintiff is the sum of $35,000.00 per year or $2,917.00 per 
month, representing the mid-point of income from available 
employment opportunities on a full-time basis for the Plaintiff 
as a registered licensed Pharmacist. 
63. The Court finds that the Defendant's income during 
the period 1981 through 1988, the time in which he has been a 
shareholder in the law firm at which he is employed, including 
annual gross salary and quarterly bonuses, is $71,373.00, or 
$5,948.00 per month. 
64. The Court finds that, based upon the financial 
needs and requirements of the parties1 minor child, the award of 
joint legal custody hereunder, and the income and expenses of the 
respective parties, that the level of total child support for the 
parties1 minor child shall be set at $900 per month. 
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65. The Court finds the Plaintiff's proportionate 
share of the parties' combined income to be 32.9% and the 
Defendant's proportionate share of the parties1 combined income 
to be 67.1%. The Court further finds that under the joint legal 
custody award, and in light of an appropriate reasonable and 
liberal visitation schedule, it is reasonable that the parties' 
minor child will spend 57% of his time with Plaintiff, who has 
primary physical custody, and 43% of his time with the Defendant. 
66. The Court finds that there are no extraordinary 
medical expenses relating to the parties' minor child and that 
the work-related child-care costs for said minor child will 
approximate $108 per month. 
67. The Court finds that the Defendant should be 
ordered to pay to the Plaintiff the sum of $324.90 per month as 
and for child support during the period of time that the parties' 
minor child is in the physical custody of the Plaintiff, and 
$108.90 per month when said minor child is in the physical 
custody of the Defendant pursuant to the computation schedule 
attached hereto as Appendix E and by this reference incorporated 
herein and made a part thereof. The Court finds in addition that 
all such child support payments shall continue until the parties' 
minor child reaches the age of majority or is earlier emanci-
pated. 
68. The Defendant has stipulated and the Court finds 
that the Defendant should be additionally responsible for tuition 
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costs and expenses for the attendance of the minor child of the 
parties at Rowland Hall St. Mark's School in Salt Lake City, 
Utah, a private educational institution, through the sixth grade, 
provided however that such may be re-evaluated upon the occur-
rence of either or both of the following: 
(a) That tuition costs increase more than thirty 
percent (30%) over 1988-89 school year levels; or 
(b) That Defendant's income decreases by more 
than thirty percent (30%) over his 1988 income level. 
69. The Court finds that the Defendant shall maintain 
a life insurance policy currently available to him through his 
employment, in the face amount of $200,000.00 in full force and 
effect for the benefit of the parties' minor child during the 
Defendant's obligation for the payment of support thereof, and 
further that such policy shall never be in an amount less than 
the present value of the unpaid child support obligations of the 
Defendant. The Court finds in addition that a corporate fidu-
ciary shall be named as a trustee in an unfunded life insurance 
trust for the benefit of the parties' minor child, which corpo-
rate fiduciary shall be disinterested in the family of either 
party. 
70. The Court finds with respect to the unfunded life 
insurance trust which Defendant is required to establish for the 
benefit of the parties1 minor child, that the Defendant, along 
with the corporate fiduciary, are responsible for establishing 
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appropriate terms, conditions, and procedures with respect to 
funding and income distribution from said unfunded life insurance 
trust, 
71. The Court finds that the Defendant should name, as 
an insured on his existing medical insurance policy, the parties' 
minor child during the Defendant's obligation of payment of child 
support therefore, and both parties should cooperate in all 
respects in the presentation and processing of all claims. The 
Court further finds that non-insured medical and dental expenses, 
including deductibles, should be borne equally by the parties. 
The Court further finds that if psychological counseling for the 
parties' minor child continues beyond the date of entry of the 
Decree of Divorce herein, each party shall bear one-half (1/2) of 
such counseling costs and expenses not otherwise covered by the 
insurance of either of the parties. 
FINDINGS ON MISCELLANEOUS ISSUES 
72. The Court finds that in accordance with the 
Plaintiff's request, the Plaintiff shall be restored to her 
maiden name of Mary Elizabeth Moriarty. 
73. The Court finds that each party should be respon-
sible for the payment of their own costs, attorneys' fees, and 
expert witness fees if any, incurred in connection with this 
matter, provided however, that the Defendant should pay toward 
the Plaintiff's attorneys' fees the sum of $5,000.00. 
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74. The Court finds that each of the parties should be 
awarded their own personal effects, belongings, wearing apparel, 
jewelry and gifts from each other and such property as they 
received by way of gift or inheritance or as premarital property, 
as their sole and separate property without claim from the other. 
75. The Court finds that the parties have acquired 
various tapes, pictures and video tapes, which the Plaintiff 
should provide to the Defendant as he designates for copying at 
his sole cost and expense. 
76. The Court finds that there is no harassment, 
annoyance or physically or verbally confrontative behavior 
presently occurring between the parties, nor is there any credi-
ble evidence that such behavior has occurred for a substantial 
period of time previously. Accordingly, the Court finds that 
there is no present necessity to enter a mutual restraining order 
against the parties to limit or otherwise restrict their contact. 
In the event that such conduct manifests itself, the Court may 
make such future orders as are necessary, if any. 
77. The Court finds that the parties should file joint 
federal and state income tax returns for the tax year 1988, and 
that the parties should cooperate in all respects in the prepara-
tion and filing of such returns in such ways so as to minimize 
the overall joint taxes payable for the tax year 1988. If any 
such additional taxes are due and payable, the Defendant shall 
bear that expense. If either a state or federal tax refund is to 
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be received by the parties, it shall first be used to offset any 
state or federal tax liability for the tax year 1988, and then 
remaining amounts, if any, shall be jointly divided between the 
parties. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, and the 
stipulations and Memorandum Decision heretofore made and entered, 
the Court now concludes as follows: 
1. That the Court has jurisdiction over the subject 
matter hereof and the parties hereto. 
2. That the parties are entitled to be awarded a 
Decree of Divorce each from the other on the grounds of irrecon-
cilable differences and that such should become final upon its 
entry as provided by law. 
3. That the Plaintiff should be awarded her maiden 
name of Mary Elizabeth Moriarty. 
4. That the alimony, custody, child support and 
property distribution, and all other provisions of the Decree of 
Divorce should be entered pursuant to the Findings of Fact and 
Appendices entered herein, and pursuant to the Memorandum Deci-
sion which by this reference are incorporated herein and made a 
part hereof. 
5. That each party should be required and ordered to 
properly execute and deliver such documents as may be necessary 
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or appropriate to accomplish the transfer and disposition of the 
assets above awarded by the Court to the party entitled thereto, 
and to properly execute and deliver such documents to do such 
other things as may be necessary or appropriate to accomplish any 
of the other Findings and/or Conclusions by the Court herein. 
6. That each of the parties should assume, pay and 
discharge his or her own costs and expenses, including attorneys' 
fees and expert witness fees incurred in connection herewith, 
provided, however, that the Defendant shall pay to Plaintiff's 
attorneys the sum of $5,000 towards Plaintiff's attorneys fees. 
7. That the Court shall make and enter its Decree of 
Divorce accordingly. 




CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I caused to be hand delivered, a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLU-
SIONS OF LAW to the following on this 2Irc/dav of flj*j 
1989: 
Paul H. Liapis 
GUSTIN, ADAMS, STEGALL & LIAPIS 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Third Floor 
New York Building 
48 Post Office Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 






(FROM TRIAL EXHIBIT 30D) 
MARITAL ESTATE DISTRIBUTION 
Mary M. Thronson 
Property Value 
All property brought into marriage 
(Desk, wardrobe, bed, chairs, chests, 
clothing, books, records, etc.) 
Sleeper Sofa $1,000.00* 
Mahogany Chair 500.00 
Oak Table 200.00 
Brass Table Lamp 50.00 
Large Cedar Chest 75.00 
Brass Lamp & Shade 100.00 
Brass Table Lamp 50.00 
Book Cases 90.00 
Two Mahogany Chairs 200.00 
Two Mahogany Tables 400.00 
All of Patrick's Furniture (Bed, Dresser, 
Bookshelves, Chair, Lamp, etc.) 600.00* 
Air Conditioners (2) 800.00* 
Wall Pictures 100.00* 
Bedding & Linen 400.00* 
Kitchen Table & Chairs 50.00 







Color Television 500.00* 
Television Stand 150.00* 




Everyday Stainless Steel, Everyday 
Dishes, Glassware, Appliances, etc. 1,000.00 
Small Tent 150.00 
Exercise Bike 600.00 
Wheelbarrow 50.00* 
Grill 75.00* 
Shop Vac 75.00* 
Camping Equipment 200.00 
Compact Discs, Tapes & Records 200.00 
Compact Disc Player 200.00* 
Pre-Amplifier 400.00* 
Record Player 650.00* 
Cabinet 200.00* 
TOTAL VALUE $17,076.21 
* Estimated value 
2734-1E.DV3 2 
EXHIBIT C 
(FROM TRIAL EXHIBIT 30D) 
MARITAL ESTATE DISTRIBUTION 
Charles H. Thronson 
Property 
All property brought into marriage 
(including 1973 Motorcycle, books, 
records, clothes, bed, etc.) 
Dining Room Table Pad 
Bed Frame 
Green Chair 









Tools, cabinet & vise 
Telephone answering machine 
Large Tent 
Rowing Machine 




Bedding & Linen 
Stainless Steel Utensils 6 































. 0 0 * 
. 0 0 * 
. 0 0 * 
.00 
.00 






. 0 0 * 
.00 
. 0 0 * 












Tape Deck 800.00* 
Tuner 500.00* 
Amplifier 500.00* 
Speakers & Wire 3#000.00* 
Hedge Trimmer 30.00* 
Miscellaneous Tools 150.00* 
TOTAL VALUE $11,647.50 
* Estimated value 
TabB 
APPENDIX " 3 " 
in 
Prooerty Descnotion • . 
CASH 
First Security-4i(e ii.ll 
First Security-Wife 43.00 
Valley Bank-Husband !166.84 
Sessions i Moore Trust 12231,.14 







':ouri:e or ' mienl 














1986 Mercedes 25972.56 
1986 Toyota Land Cruise 18368.80 
1973 Yaaaha 360 MX 
1983 IR500R Honda 2004.30 
1986 XLV750R Honda 5599.70 
1986 XR600R Honda 
Three bike trailer 910.00 
1980 Blazer Sale Contract 
25972.56 25972.56 Exhibit 100 
18368.80 18363.30 Exhibit 30D 
.00 Preeantal Asset (CHT) 
2004.50 2004.50 Exhibit 300 
3699.70 5699.70 Exhibit 300 
.00 Note 1 
910.00 910.00 Exhibit 30D 
.00 Note 2 
FURNITURE I FUTURES 
Furniture, Appliances 28723.71 





17076.21 Note 7 
Fthihii ]no 
RETIREMENT ACCOUNTS 
Retirement Plan at PBL 259282.21 
IRA Zion's-Husband 9095.45 










Annuity Western Mutual 28582.36 
Annuity Aetna 21438.70 
28582.26 
21438.70 21433.70 
28582.36 Exhibit 38D 
Exhibit 380 
REAL PROPERTY 
2063 Hubbard Avenue 
1340 South 2500 East 







First Security Bank 
SL Fatily Therapy 
Valley Rank UTCA 
Nerdstroe's 
ZCMI 
Noaii Matt is 
Key Bank VISA 
First Security Quickliat 
Zion's First National 























































A. Plaintiff should not receive reimbursement ot $I"\ 8 IB 1;> t r 
use of Inherited funds during divorce proceeding, 
B. All proceeds from the iile uf t lm I n I 1 nw i i \ spcinitiHi IWHIP 
used to pay taxes: 
Fidelity Magellan Fund 
Fidelity Short Term 
Mutual Shares Corp. 
20th Century Select 
Vanguard Fund 
^m I9B 7 State Tax Refund was divided between Plaintiff and 
Defendant. 
D. Monies from the following accounts were used h fm\ \nh\t 
debts and obligations of the parties: 
First Security 
American Savings 
Merrill Lynch Joint Account 
E Attorneys' fees and costs are not listed for either party. 
Each party will pay their own 
SPECIFIC NOTES 
1 Acquired by Defendant with inherited funds. 
2. All proceeds from the sale ot 1*111 f) Blazer were used fm 1 oini 
obligations. 
j. Valued and distributed pursuant to Exhibit 30D. Those items 
that were not specifically valued on Exhibit 30D are marked 
with an asterisk on Exhibits B and C, attached hereto and 
originally attached to Exhibit 4ID. 
4. Pension Plan Value ($269,382.21) as per Larry Worrell - 2 * 
$134,691.10 for each party. Pursuant to Plaintiff's request 
at the Pretrial, the Plaintiff would receive all of the equity 
in the home at 2063 Hubbard Avenue ($54,477.38) and Plaintiff 
would reduce her claim to her share of the pension plan by 
$2^,238.69. 
Li. A $3,500.00 payment was made to the IRS by Defendant for 
estimated 1988 taxes at the time Plaintiff and Defendant filed 




JUN 2 3 1989 
By. HE. 
CLARK W. SESSIONS (2914) 
DEAN C. ANDREASEN (3981) 
SESSIONS & MOORE 
Attorneys for Defendant 
400 First Federal Plaza 
505 East 200 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 359-4100 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MARY M. THRONSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CHARLES H. THRONSON, 
Defendant. 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. D-87-4318 
Judge David S. Young 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial on the 
25th day of April, 1989, and continued thereafter for three days 
before the Honorable David S. Young, one of the Judges of the 
above-entitled Court. The Plaintiff was present in person and 
represented by Paul H. Liapis and Helen Christian of Gust in, Green, 
Stegall & Liapis, her attorneys. The Defendant was present in 
person and represented by his attorney, Clark W. Sessions of 
Sessions & Moore. The Court heard the evidence adduced, reviewed 
and considered the issues and stipulations presented and, after 
taking the matter under advisement, rendered its Memorandum 
Decision on the 9th day of May, 1989, and having made and entered 
its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and being fully advised 
in the premises, hereby ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES as follows: 
1. That the parties be and they are hereby awarded a Decree 
of Divorce each from the other on the grounds of irreconcilable 
differences and that such Decree of Divorce shall become final upon 
its entry as provided by law. 
2. That the Plaintiff is awarded alimony in the sum of 
$800.00 per month for a period of one (1) year commencing in June, 
1989 and concluding in May, 1990, following which alimony shall 
cease and terminate. 
3. That the Plaintiff be and she is hereby awarded her 
maiden name of Mary Elizabeth Moriarty. 
4. That the parties be and they are hereby awarded joint 
legal custody of the parties' minor child Patrick Thronson, 
provided however, that if either party determines to leave the 
State of Utah, custody of said child should transfer to the party 
remaining in the State of Utah. 
5. That the parties shall arrange between themselves 
reasonable and liberal visitation by the parties of Patrick 
Thronson consistent with the best interests of said child. 
6. That the total child support payable for the support and 
maintenance of the parties' minor child Patrick Thronson shall be 
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$900.00 per month. The Defendant be and he is hereby ordered to 
pay for the support and maintenance of said minor child the sum of 
$324.90 per month when the Plaintiff has physical custody of said 
minor child and the sum of $108.90 per month when the Defendant has 
physical custody of said minor child. 
7. That the Defendant shall maintain in full force and 
effect, at his cost and expense, life insurance on his life for the 
benefit of the parties' minor child, Patrick Thronson, in the face 
amount of $200,000.00, which policy shall not be less than the 
present value of the unpaid child support obligation of the 
Defendant during the period of the minority of said minor child. 
The Defendant be and he is hereby ordered to designate and name a 
corporate fiduciary in an unfunded life insurance trust to 
implement the life insurance provisions hereof which corporate 
trustee shall be disinterested in the family of either of the 
parties hereto. 
8. That the Defendant be and he is hereby ordered to 
maintain in full force and effect and at his cost and expense, 
existing health insurance coverage naming the parties' minor child, 
Patrick Thronson as an insured thereunder during the period of time 
the Defendant is under an obligation for the payment of child 
support. The parties are hereby ordered to assume, pay and 
discharge, on an equal basis, all medical and dental costs and 
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expenses for the care and treatment of the parties' minor child 
Patrick Thronson not covered by such insurance and the Defendant 
is further ordered to cooperate in all respects in the presentation 
and processing of all claims for benefits under such health 
insurance plan. 
9. That the Defendant be and he is hereby ordered to assume 
and pay tuition costs and expenses for the attendance of the 
parties' minor child Patrick Thronson at Rowland Hall through the 
sixth grade; provided however, such responsibility may be re-
evaluated upon the occurrence of either or both of the following: 
a. That the tuition costs increase more than thirty 
percent (30%) over present levels; or, 
b. That the Defendant's income decreases by more than 
thirty percent (30%) over present levels. 
10. That the Plaintiff be and she is hereby awarded the 
following property and property interests, subject to any 
indebtedness thereon, as her sole and separate property, without 
claim from the Defendant: 
a. The residence at 2063 Hubbard Avenue, subject to the 
Plaintiff's payment of the unpaid mortgage; 
b. The parties' 1986 Mercedes; 
c. All furniture, furnishings, fixtures, and other 
personal property contained in the home at this time; 
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d. A portion of value of the Defendant's interest in 
the retirement plan of Parsons, Behle & Latimer in the present 
value amount of $105,000.00 which interest and additional 
contribution as hereinafter set forth, shall be the subject 
of a Qualified Domestic Relations Order as defined in the 
Retirement Equity Act of 1984 P.L. 98-397; 
e. The Plaintiff is further entitled to one-half of the 
pro rated annual contribution to be made to the Parsons, Behle 
& Latimer retirement plan on behalf of the Defendant to cover 
any period prior to May 1, 1989 whenever that contribution is 
made; 
f. The Plaintiff's IRA at Continental Bank; 
g. The parties' Western Mutual annuity; 
h. The parties' Dual Asset Fund #V; 
i. The two First Security accounts presently utilized 
by the Plaintiff; 
j. One-half of the account held in trust at Sessions 
& Moore for the benefit of the parties; 
k. $2,002.00 as a cash payment from the Defendant to 
compensate Plaintiff for the Defendant's value represented in 
the Parsons, Behle & Latimer stock; 
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1. All other personal clothing, apparel, effects, 
objets d'art, and other personal property currently in the 
Plaintiff's possession and not otherwise dealt with herein. 
11. That the Defendant be and he is hereby awarded the 
following property and property interests, subject to any 
indebtedness thereon, as his sole and separate property, without 
claim from the Plaintiff: 
a. The Defendant's residence at 1940 South 2500 East, 
purchased with separate inherited funds; 
b. The parties' 1986 Toyota Landcruiser; 
c. The parties' 1983 Honda XR500R; the parties' 1986 
Honda XLV750R and the parties' three bike trailer; 
d. All furniture, furnishings, fixtures and appliances 
currently in the possession of the Defendant; 
e. All office furniture located both at the Defendant's 
residence and at Parsons, Behle & Latimer office; 
f. All Parsons, Behle & Latimer stock; 
g. One-half of the account held in trust at Sessions 
& Moore for the benefit of the parties; 
h. The Valley Bank account utilized by the Defendant; 
i. The remainder of the Defendant's interest in his 
retirement plan at Parsons, Behle & Latimer; 
j. The Defendant's IRA at Zions Bank; 
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k. The Aetna annuity; 
1. All personal effects, clothing, apparel, objets 
d'art, etc. currently in the possession of the Defendant. 
12. That the Plaintiff be and she is hereby ordered to 
assume, pay, discharge and hold the Defendant harmless from the 
following debts and obligations: 
a. The unpaid mortgage on the parties' residence at 
2063 Hubbard Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah; 
b. Nordstrom's account; 
c. ZCMI account; 
d. Bill due to Dr. Naomi Maddis for services rendered; 
e. Key Bank Visa Card balance; 
f. First Security Bank Quickline balance; 
g. Zions First National Bank loan balance; 
h. First Security Bank Visa balance; 
i. Any and all other liabilities incurred by the 
Plaintiff since separation not otherwise dealt with directly 
herein. 
13. That the Defendant be and he is hereby ordered to assume, 
pay, discharge and hold the Plaintiff harmless from the following 
debts and obligations: 
a. The unpaid mortgage on his residence at 1940 South 
2500 East; 
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b. R. C. Willey account 
c. MBNA Mastercard account; 
d. First Security Bank account; 
e. SL Family Therapy account; 
f. Valley Bank Visa Card account; 
g. The balance due on the 1988 taxes; 
h. Any and all other obligations incurred by the 
Defendant since separation not otherwise dealt with. 
14. That the Plaintiff be and she is hereby ordered to 
provide such of the parties' pictures, tapes and recordings to the 
Defendant as he shall designate for duplication at his sole cost 
and expense. 
15. That each of the parties shall assume and pay one-half 
(1/2) of non-insured counseling costs and expenses for the parties' 
minor child Patrick Thronson if such is continued beyond the date 
of entry hereof. 
16. That each of the parties shall assume and pay their own 
costs and attorneys fees incurred in connection herewith, provided 
however, tha Defendant be and he is hereby ordered to pay toward 
the Plaintiff's attorneys fees the sum of $5,000.00. 
17. That the parties be and they are hereby ordered to 
execute such deeds, conveyances, bills of sale and other documents 
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as may be necessary or appropriate to transfer the property as 
awarded by the Court to the party entitled thereto. 




CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I caused to be hand delivered, a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing DECREE OF DIVORCE to the 
following on this JUn/ day of May, 1989: 
Paul H. Liapis 
GUSTIN, ADAMS, STEGELL & LIAPIS 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Third Floor 
New York Building 
48 Post Office Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
A/J&A / t 6^nWUfrl4~>y 
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subject: to reasonable rights of visitation to include every ether 
weekend from Friday at 6:00 p.m. to Sunday at 6:00 p.m., 
alternating red letter calendar holidays, two weeks in the 
summer, Christmas morning from 1:00 p.m. to the following morning 
at 9:G0 a.m., one-half of the Christmas vacation time, Father's 
Day for Defendant and Mother's Day for Plaintiff. 
3. Plaintiff's inheritance should be restored to her prior to 
the division of the assets. 
J/. Plaintiff should be awarded alimony in the sum of $2,500.00 
per month for a period of. 5 years and therearter $1.00 per year 
until she remarries, dies or cohabits. 
5. Defendant should pay to Plaintiff child support in the sum 
of $1,276.04 per month until the child attains the age of 18 
years and graduates from high school. 
6. Defendant should advance to the Plaintiff the sum of 
$31,000.00 for the purchase of furniture and $5,900.00 to 
reimburse Plaintiff for her purchase of blinds and a piano. 
7. Defendant should maintain health, accident, hospitalization, 
and dental insurance for the minor child until he attains the age 
of 21 years. 
8. Defendant should maintain a minimum of $200,000.00 of life 
insurance on his life with the child named as his sole 
beneficiary thereon. 
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Item No. 159 
EXPECTATION OF UFE AND MORTALITY RATES, BY 
RACE, AGE, AND SEX 
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